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"Neither a borrower nor a lender be; for loan oft loses both itself and friend."
-

Polonius to Laertes, in Hamlet, Act I, Scene iii.
I. INTRODUCTION

The world debt crisis might never have occupied the front pages of our newspapers during much of the past decade if more attention had been paid to the advice
old Polonius gave to young Laertes. More than one Secretary of the Treasury has tried
to control a multibillion dollar problem of money addiction, whose resolution sometimes seems to lie in the realm of financial eschatology.1
William W. Park, 1989
*

Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., Yale University; J.D., Columbia University; M.A., Cambridge

University. Professor Park has also taught in France at the University of Dijon, in Switzerland at Geneva's Institut de
Hautes Etudes Internationales and in England as a Fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge. He is a member of the
Massachusetts and the District of Columbia Bars and is Counsel, Ropes & Gray, Boston.
Thanks are due to my research assistants Joe Muskatel and Richard Brown, to my colleagues Dan Partan and Gil
Verbit, and to my mentors Jack Hutchings and Philippe Neyroud.
1. See, e.g., "Plan or No Plan, Debt Relief Is Not Around the Corner," N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, § 4, at 1,
col. 4; Brady'sMexicanHat Trick, TitE EcONOmSsT, July 29, 1989 at 61. At this writing, the so called "Brady plan" seems
to have achieved only mixed results in significant debt reduction. On the present state of the debt crisis, see generally
Whalen, Brady Debt Plan:Dead in the Water, N.Y. Times, at 38, cols. 2-3. See also Johnson, Left Hand, Right Hand,
139 THE BANKER 144 (1989); Farnsworth, FinancialOfficials FearGlobal Trade Imbalance, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989,
at D8, col. 1; Fuerbringer, Mexico Says Banks' Move CouldReduce New Lending, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at D1,
col. 1; Moffett, Mexico's CapitalFlight Still Wracks Economy, DespiteBrady Plan, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1989, at Al,
col. 6; Bartlett, The Third World Debt CrisisReshapes America's Banks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989, § 4. at 3, col. 1;
Bartlett, Third World Debt Woes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1989, at 11, col. 1; Guenther, Morgan Bolsters Loan Reserves
by $2 Billion, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1989, at A3, col. 1; Quint, Brady's Debt PlanForcing Big Banks to IncreaseLosses,
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The debt crisis is part of the same sad story as capital flight. While bankers and
politicians try to renegotiate unmanageable loans, capital fleeing the debtor countries
often ends up as deposits in the lending banks. Much of this capital is exported as the
result of an understandable desire to protect against local currency devaluation or an
unstable political situation. A significant portion goes out in violation of exchange
control or fiscal regulations. 2 In some cases -the funds may have been obtained
through corruption.
A century ago, debt default by a less developed country might have been dealt
with by creditor-country gunboats or forced arbitration. 3 Today, however, the debt
crisis plays itself out in legal policy conflicts, both among and within nations, and pits
parochial national concerns against common global interests. Competing objectives of
international banking law, each desirable when viewed alone, often clash with each
other when extended. 4 Such policy conflicts arise among nations when vital interests
of one country ask for sacrifice from another. For example, many Swiss bankers
perceive Switzerland's tradition of banking secrecy as important to the ability of its
financial institutions to attract deposits, while law enforcement officials in the United
States see this secrecy as an instrument to facilitate violation of American securities
and fiscal legislation. Policy clashes occur within a nation when fiscal concessions
aimed at attracting foreign capital create inequity with local taxpayers and tempt
domestic tax cheats to use foreign banks to disguise their identities. Finally, parochial
national policies run counter to the common goal of international monetary cooperation
when exchange controls designed to protect the value of one country's currency distort
efficient-capital flows that are in the interest of all members of the world community.
Lending to developing countries presents a springboard from which to explore
policy conflicts in the law of international banking. We shall see that the "act of
state" and "sovereign immunity" doctrines help to reduce the chance that awkward
judicial decisions will impede the conduct of foreign relations by the executive branch
of the government. But these doctrines do not marry well with the competing objective of encouraging lender confidence in international loan agreements. The International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement attempt to address a related conflict
between each member country's obligation to respect exchange controls of other
members, and the common goal of free payments of interest on cross-border loans.
On the liability side of the bank's balance sheet, 5 clashes of policy relate to the

N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1989 at 1, col. 1; Int'l Herald Tribune, Jan. 28, 1987, at col. 5. For a general history of the current
debt crisis in the context of six centuries of cross-border lending, see Todd, A BriefHistory of InternationalLendingfrom
a Regional Banker'sPerspective, 11 GEORGE
MASON L. REv. 1 (1989).
2. See Walter, The Mechanisms of Capital Flight, in CA'rA. FuGtrr ANDTHiRD WORLD DEBT 103 (Lessard &
Williamson eds. 1987). See also I. WALT-ER,
SECREr MONEY (1985); Henry, Where the Money Went, NEw REsuauc, Apr.
14, 1986, at 20.
3. See D. Vagts, Transnational Business Problems 482 (1986).
4. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (Chief Justice Burger, in a different context,
remarking on principles that would be extended but cannot because of the existence of competing principles, in the context
of a first amendment challenge to a New York City tax exemption for religious organizations).
5. On bank accounting, see J. KOLTVEr, Accourr FOR BANKS
(1986). On the asset side we find loans from the
bank to its debtors. On the liability side are found deposits (obligations of the bank to depositors). Add liabilities to equity
and the sum is assets.
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use of economic regulation for political ends (such as the freezing of Iranian and Libyan
bank accounts), the capital flight facilitated by "haven country" banking secrecy, and
the way secrecy laws vital to one country's private banking industry impede the
enforcement of revenue laws and securities regulations of another. Within the United
States itself, the desire for secrecy may give rise to policy conflicts. To attract foreign
capital to American markets, the government accommodates the foreign investor
sensitive to maintaining anonymity by providing relaxed disclosure requirements for
owners of foreign-targeted securities. However, to preserve the integrity of the tax
system and securities markets, government agencies may need to compel the production of documents that the foreign investor would rather keep to himself and his
banker. Even routine information reporting with respect to payments to persons
claiming to be nonresident aliens creates a conflict between the investor's desire for
anonymity and the government's concern for gathering information necessary to law
enforcement.
The lack of confidence in the local economy that contributes to the flight of
capital often reflects the same national problems that contribute to the debtor country's difficulty in honoring its loan obligations. The vicious circle completes itself
when the flight of capital in turn depletes the foreign exchange available for the
debtor country to repay its cross-border borrowings.
Developing nations are occasionally depicted as innocent victims of the greed of
industrialized countries. This portrayal leads to suggestions that their debt be adjusted
for the sake of what might be called international economic justice. 6 Yet many leaders
of the borrower nations, some of them among the world's richest individuals, show
little inclination to keep their own wealth in local assets, let alone share it with less
fortunate compatriots. 7 A significant portion of this wealth leaves to be invested
abroad or deposited in foreign banks.
Calls for forgiveness of Third World debt, in the name of economic justice or
otherwise, raise hard questions. Where did the borrowed money go? To what extent
will loan default chill the future cross-border lending needed to finance future development? How will debt reduction affect the soundness of banks in lender countries?

6. See, e.g., Statement of the World Christian workers Movement (Mouvement Mondial des Travailleurs Chrdtiens) that "the debt [of the Third World] and its payment are the fatal result of an international strategy arranged to
maximize [rich country] profits." Vie Protestante, July 14, 1989, at 5. The French original reads in extenso:
Selon le MMTC, ,la dette et son paiement sont le fatal rdsultat d'une stratdgie internationale mise en place pour
un profit maximum, et les modules imposds qui en ddcoulent ne tiennent compte ni des cultures, ni des besoins
des peuples.. Pour le MMTC, <ceux des pays du tiers monde sont obligs de travalller surtout pour rembourser
]a dette aux riches au ditriment des besoins essentiels. qui sont les leurs, et ceux des pays industrialisds ont du
mal ai rdagir solidairement contre le <laissez-faire laissez-passer politique ambiant>,.
See also UNnW CHURCH OFCuis'r, CHRisnAN FATinANDEcoNo. ,tc LiFE 21-45 (prepared for 17th General Synod,
U.C.C.) (A Smock ed. 1987).
Other views from the left are more sophisticated. See, e.g., Frankenberg and Knieper, Legal Problems in the
Overindebtednessof Developing Countries: The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of OdiousDebts, 12 INr'L J. Soc. L.
415 (1984), drawing attention to the doubtful developmental value of many loans contracted by third world countries. One
may ask, however, whether their suggestion of creditor responsibility for determining borrower country needs is compatible
with third world self-determination. It may be a situation where creditors are "damned if they do and damned if they don't.'"
7. See discussion of the Marcos, Mobutu and Suharto cases by the Ghana diplomat, B.N. Ayittey, The Real
ForeignDebt Problem, Wall Street J., Apr. 8, 1986, at 30, col. 3.
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Too often, scholars forget that legal issues related to loans interact with legal
problems engendered by deposits. To divorce one from the other distorts analysis.
Banks lend other people's money. Loans on the asset side of a bank's balance sheet
are financed by the deposits on its liability side.
The depositors, whose money the banks are using to fund credit, care above all
for the security of the bank's assets, which is to say the recoverability of its loans.$
However, the same depositors also seek confidentiality. Laws protecting confidentiality permit significant amounts of capital to be deposited with international banks
in violation of exchange controls or fiscal rules, 9 which in turn makes it harder for
developing countries to repay their loans. American attempts to lift foreign bank
secrecy in order to compel information interfere with the deposit gathering necessary
to fund loans. Routine information reporting raises a similar need to weigh the
confidentiality sought by the depositor against the integrity of American tax and
securities legislation.
Lending nation policies have not been models of consistency. American and
European banks want to recover on foreign loans, yet support tax and secrecy measures
to attract flight capital that in turn exacerbates the inability of some countries to pay
their hard currency debts. American banks want to attract foreign deposits while their
government freezes accounts of some of their biggest oil-producing customers. The
United States puts high value on respect for promises when its banks want to recover
on loans, yet imposes economic regulations that sometimes make it hard or impossible
for its banks to deliver on their own promises to repay their depositors.
In the interest of a more efficient international banking system, resolution of these
conflicts requires concession and compromise between allies and trading partners
based on sensitivity to common values shared by the world economic community. To
this end, scholars are called to face squarely the connectedness of legal choices in
transnational finance, the tension in competing goals, and our inability to have it all.
11. CROss-BORDER LOANS: BANKS AS TRANSNATIONAL LENDERS

The fifteenth chapter of Deuteronomy requires creditors to cancel indebtedness
every seven years.' 0 Modern borrowers are not likely to be so lucky, at least not until
the Messiah either arrives or returns, depending on one's theology.

8. Critical regulatory issues include assuring careful accounting for problem loans and the maintenance of
adequate capital-to-asset ratios and bad debt reserves.
In this connection the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 required American banking agencies to
determine reserves on bank balance sheets and loan loss provisions (against income) for loans to countries subject to a high
transfer risk, and clarified minimum ratios of capital to total assets. 12 U.S.C. § 3904 (1988). See also BASLE CoMMTrrr
ON REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRAcTIcEs (B.I.S.), REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENcE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT
AND CAPITAL STANDARDS

(1988).

9. For a survey of some of the technical issues related to what is often called "private," or "high net worth,"
international banking the reader is immodestly referred to Park, American Income Tax Aspects ofTrans-BorderSecurities
Investment, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 67 (1986); Park, Compelling Informationfrom Foreign Corporations:Secrecy Law and
PERSPECTIVE
385 (R. Zch
IN UNrrED STATES REAL ESTATE FROMA EUROPEAN
U.S. Economic Regulation, in INvESrMENTs
161 (1985).
ed. 1985); Park, Backup Withholding, ForeignBanks and BearerBonds, 1 J. OFSTRATEGY ININr'L TAXATION
10. Deuteronomy 15:l-"At the end of every seven years you shall grant remission of debts."
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The debt crisis that manifested itself in the early 1980's has elsewhere received
considerable public and scholarly attention, particularly with respect to attempts to
reschedule loans to problem countries in order to avert the prospect of default.'
Analysis has focused on the way that developing nations have been squeezed between
the Scylla of high interest rates and the Charybdis of low foreign exchange earnings.
Some commentators have noted the aggravation of the crisis due to flight of local
capital, provoked by fear of inflation and political instability.
Whatever the fundamental causes and long term cures of the crisis, its resolution
must be linked to confidence in the enforceability of cross-border loan agreements.
The legal reliability of international credit contracts remains essential to any new
lending to assist debtor nations. If international credit is to play a part in world
development, financial institutions must feel secure in their ability to vindicate their
right to be paid by foreign borrowers. The legal obstacles to such financial security
include the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity.
A.

The Act of State Defense

The act of state doctrine has been called "perhaps the most written-about topic
in international law journals in this country." 1 2 A colleague in England once remarked, "With the act of state doctrine, you Americans have turned a simple choice13
of-law rule into an industry."
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States formulates the act of state doctrine as follows:
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining the validity of
a taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory, or from sitting in judgment
on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory and
4
applicable there.1
Much debate has focused on the theoretical basis of the doctrine, which is often
viewed as originating almost a hundred years ago in Underhill v. Hernandez.15 In this
case an American citizen brought an action against a military commander to recover

11. See, e.g., Barnett, Galvis & Couraige, On Third World Debt, 25 HARv. INT'L L.J. 83 (1984); Default by
ForeignGovernment Debtors, 1982 U. IL. L. REv. 1. See also Amaral, Debt CrisisFrom the Pointof View of the Debtor
Country, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 633 (1985); Eskridge, Les Jeux Sont Faits:Structural Originsof the International
Debt Problem, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 281 (1985); Leiseca & Studwell, Latin American Accounts Receivable: To Sue for
Collection or to Refinance 39 Bus. LAW. 495 (1984).
12. The InternationalRule of Law Act: Hearing on S. 1434 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaw of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981) (testimony of Davis R. Robinson, Legal Advisor to the
Department of State). For a representative listing of leading articles, see Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine:An
Analysis in Terms of Jurisdictionto Prescribe, 62 WVASH.
L. REv. 397, 398 n.3 (1987).
13. John Collier, Fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge. Conversation with W.W. Park in October 1975.
14. RESTATE.IENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELAioNs LAW OF THEUNTED STATES§ 443 (1987).

15. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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damages for alleged assaults and illegal confinement suffered in the course of a
revolution in Venezuela. The court refused to determine liability on the grounds that
American courts could not sit in judgment on the acts of a foreign state. Chief Justice
Fuller stated:
Every sovereign is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
6
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.'
Scholars have pointed out that the original jurisprudential underpinnings of the
act of state doctrine lay in turn-of-the-century choice-of-law theory.1 7 In the first
decade of the century Holmes wrote that "the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done." t8 The act of state doctrine was an expression of deference by the United
States judiciary to the authority of foreign sovereigns within their own territories.
By the time the Supreme Court revisited the act of state doctrine in the 1960s a
new justification had been proposed. 19 In 1964, the Court decided the well-known
Sabbatino case, which involved expropriated Cuban sugar sold to Morocco by a New
York sugar broker. 20 The bill of lading, representing the right to take delivery of the
sugar, ended up in New York. 2' Deciding that title to the bill of lading was held by
the Cuban government rather than the expropriated owner, the Supreme Court found
"constitutional underpinnings" for its decision in the separation of powers between
the executive and judicial branches of government. 22 Justice Harlan stated that the act
of state doctrine on which his decision rested was exclusively an aspect of federal
law. 23 Courts should not hinder the President and State Department in the conduct of
foreign policy by passing judgment on the validity of acts by foreign governments
with which the executive branch might negotiate. The act of state doctrine was thus
no longer based primarily on deference to foreign law, but rather on the constitutional
separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. 24 Justice Harlan wrote:
The Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own
territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the
time of the suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law.25

16. Id. at 252.
17. Chow, supra note 12, at 404-I1.
18. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
19. Furthermore, because of the Supreme Court's intervening decisions in Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) and Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), federal courts sitting in diversity cases had to apply
the conflict rules of the state in which they were sitting. Unless the Supreme Court could find a federal basis for the act
of state doctrine, there was a probability that conflicting decisions would result.
20. Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
21. Id. at 406.
22. Id. at 423.
23. Id. at 425.
24. Chow, supra note 12, at 444.
25. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
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In essence, the courts are giving the executive a law-making function. Absent an
"unambiguous agreement," it is the President who should make claims for the
United States as to the content of international law.
The act of state doctrine after Sabbatino has been likened to a special federal
choice-of-law rule.2 6 When the doctrine does not apply, the court will use the ordinary choice-of-law rules to determine the governing law. However, the act of state
doctrine may trump the ordinary rule and impose foreign law despite an American
public policy or a rule of international law that otherwise calls into question the
27
applicability of the chosen foreign law.
In addition to the separation of executive and judicial power, another compelling
justification of the act of state doctrine lies in the greater predictability that it brings
to transborder trade. The doctrine increases commercial certainty by reducing challenges to the ownership of property obtained abroad. A buyer of goods will know that
he can safely import them into the United States without having to worry about
American judges upsetting the validity of a foreign law on which the importer's title
is based.
Several aspects of the act of state doctrine mitigate its unfairness to prior owners
of expropriated property, particularly when the foreign law is fundamentally repugnant to our basic values. The prohibition on examining the validity of the foreign law
might not apply when the State Department so requests. This "Bernstein exception"
(so called for one Mr. Bernstein who had sued to recover property confiscated by the
Nazis28 ) was elaborated in a case in which the State Department asked the court to
ignore the act of state doctrine, and restore the property to its original owner. 29
A second limit on the act of state doctrine may remove the doctrine from
consideration where property is confiscated by the foreign state in clear violation of
international law. According to Justice Harlan's articulation of the doctrine in Sabbatino, the doctrine does not apply if the issue is governed by a "treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles." 30 Moreover, the
Hickenlooper Amendment, 31 enacted in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in
Sabbatino, provides generally that American courts are not to decline to decide, on
the basis of the act of state doctrine, the validity under international law of a confiscation of property unless the President determines that the foreign policy interests
of the United States require the doctrine's applicability in the case. 32 The Hickenlooper
26. Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 CoLutm.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1965). See also
REsTATEEI:Nr (THIRD) OF FoREIGN
RELATIONS
LAW§ 443 Reporters Note 1 (1987) (The Restatement, for which Professor
Henkin was chief reporter, states that the act of state doctrine operates as "a special rule of conflict of laws.").
27. See Kirgis, Understandingthe Act of State Doctrine'sEffect, 82 At. J. INr'L L. 58 (1988); Gruson, The Act
of State Doctrine in Contract Cases as Conflict of Laws Rule, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 519.
28. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1954);
Bernstein v. Van Heygen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
29. Nederlandsche-AmerikaanscheStoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d. at 376 (The State Department press release noted that "[t]he policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the United States for restitution of such
property, is to relieve American courts from restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the acts of Nazi officials.").
30. Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
31. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
32. For the remand of the case in which the Hickenlooper Amendment was pleaded successfully, see Banco
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Amendment applies only in cases that involve title to physical property located in the
33
United States.
Finally, there is some support for the existence of a commercial activities exception to the act of state doctrine. In one case the Supreme Court has refused to
recognize an act of state defense based on a Cuban repudiation of a commercial
obligation to return overpayments by American cigar importers. Because it was only
34
a minority of the Court that based its decision on a commercial activities exception,
authority for the commercial exception to the act of state doctrine is unclear.
The Allied Bank litigation 35 of the early 1980s highlights the impact of the act
of state doctrine in a banking context. The story of three Costa Rican banks, all
wholly owned by the Costa Rican government, begins when the banks succeeded to
some of the assets and liabilities of a failed Cayman Island bank that had done most
of its business in Costa Rica. These liabilities included a debt to a syndicate of
36
thirty-nine American and European banks.
In 1981 the Costa Rican Central Bank and the Finance Minister each issued an
order which in essence prohibited payment of external debt, which is to say debt
37
denominated other than in the local currency, without Finance Ministry approval.
These decrees led to a default, and the lenders in 1982 brought an action to enforce
the promissory notes signed by the Costa Rican banks when they accepted assignment
of the loans, and to recover the balance due of approximately $4.5 million plus
accrued interest. The Costa Rican banks had consented to the jurisdiction of courts in
3
New York, the place of payment for the U.S. dollar denominated obligation.

Nacional v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). See also Bazyler, Abolishing The Act
of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 393 n.395 (1986); Zamora, Recognition of Foreign Exchange Controls in
InternationalCreditors' Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT'L LAW. 1055, 1075 (1987).
33. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
34. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The decision was reached by afive
to four vote.
In Part III of the opinion of the Court, Justice White wrote that "the concept of an act of state should not be extended
to include repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial
instrumentalities." Id. at 695. This part of the opinion was joined only by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and
Justice Rehnquist. Concurring opinions were filed by Justices Powell and Stevens, the latter of whom declared his
agreement only with Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. Id. at 715. See also Braka v. Bancomer, 762 F.2d 222, 225
(2d Cir. 1985) (leaving the issue of the existence of a comm6recial activities exception in abeyance); Chow, supra note
12, at 419-20, n. 150 (1987) (discussing Dunhilland listing lower court decisions for and against the commercial activities
exception).
35. There were three decisions: Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y.1983)
[hereinafter Allied Bank 1],
aff'd, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (unbound edition only, reprintedin 23 INT'L L. MATEIAts
742) (1984) [hereinafter Allied Bank III, withdrawnvacated on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d cir.)
[hereinafterAllied Bank I],
cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). Compare Allied Batik with Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985),
in which Mexican exchange controls mandated payment of dollar deposits in Mexican banks in pesos at below market
rates of exchange. The bank, an instrumentality of the Mexican government, was held to be entitled to sovereign
immunity, although action by the depositor was precluded under the act of state doctrine. Allied Bank has generated
voluminous comment by practitioners and scholars. See generally, Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by Default: The
Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in InternationalBusinessTransactions, 19 INT'L LAW. 225 (1985);
Rendell, The Allied Bank Caseand Its Aftermath, 20 INT'L LAW. 819 (1986); Note, The Act of State Doctrine:Resolving
Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1986); Comment, The Courts, the InternationalDebt Crisis, and the
Dilemma of Rescheduling: Rethinking the Allied Bank Decision, 46 U. Totto-rro FAc. L. REv. 578 (1988).
36. Allied Bank I, 566 F. Supp. at 1440, 1442.
37. Id.
38. Id.

1989]

LEGAL POLICY CONFLICTS IN INT'L BANKING

1075

The district court in the case accepted the borrower's act of state defense and
followed the "separation of powers" rationale, stating:
A judgment in favor of Allied in this case would constitute a judicial determination that
defendants must make payments contrary to the directives of their government. This puts the
judicial branch of the United States at odds with policies laid down by a foreign government
on an issue deemed by that government to be of central importance. Such an act by this court
between the executive branch of the United States and
risks embarrassment to the relations
39
the government of Costa Rica.
None of the exceptions to the act of state doctrine was found applicable by the
district court. The court considered the Finance Ministry decree prohibiting payment
of external debt to be "public in nature, "40 rather than commercial.
After the district court denial of Allied Bank's motion for summary judgment in
its favor, Costa Rica refinanced most of its debt with external creditors. However,
one of the banks in the syndicate-Fidelity Union Trust Company of New Jerseyrefused to go along with the rescheduling. 41 As leader of the syndicate Allied Bank
appealed the district court decision on behalf of Fidelity Union.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court decision, 42 but on grounds of
"comity," a concept akin to the "golden rule," under which the courts of one
country will not upset rights or duties created in another country as long as the foreign
acts are consistent with domestic policy of the forum. Each nation does unto others
as it wants done unto itself. 43
Comity differs from the act of state doctrine in that it will apply only if the
foreign act is consistent with American policy. And in the first appellate-go-round,
the court of appeals did so find the Costa Rican decrees. Letters from then Secretary
of State George Schultz to the then House Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill had
expressed support for further bilateral aid to Costa Rica under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 despite defaults on payments of Costa Rican government obligations.
The court analogized the Costa Rican decrees to a reorganization under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits an automatic stay of actions against the
insolvent debtor. The court saw the decrees as a rescheduling that deferred repayment, not as a debt repudiation.
The initial Allied Bank decision sent shock waves through the financial community in New York. Many feared that the decision could jeopardize the status of
New York as a center for financial transactions, in particular as an international
39. Id. at 1444.
40. Id. at 1443.
41. As a bit player on the world debt scene, Fidelity Union had its own short-term interests at heart. By threatening
to scuttle any possible Costa Rican rescheduling, it may have hoped that the heavily exposed major banks would buy out
its position. However, even though a negotiated settlement might have been in the interest of the major lenders, the other
creditors had to side with Fidelity on the legal issue to preserve their bargaining position. See generally,Comment, supra
note 35, at 584.
42. See Allied Bank 11, 733 F.2d 23 (2nd Cir. 1984). This opinion, vacated on rehearing, is found only in the
advance sheets, not the final version of the published Federal Reports.
43. One classic formulation of the comity doctrine is found in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), in which the
Supreme Court held that a foreign judgment is not conclusive as to the merits of the claim without reciprocity of treatment
to judgments of American courts.
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clearing center for repayment of dollar loans. The business of the New York banks
would be jeopardized if lenders doubted that American courts would enforce loan
agreements against borrowers in countries that unilaterally restructure their external
debt.
This fuss and consternation caused the court of appeals to grant a rehearing on
the case. Almost a year later the same three judges 44 vacated their earlier decision and
ordered the district court to grant summary judgment for the syndicate of lending
banks. 45 Judge Meskill said the district court had erred in thinking that American
policy was in accord with Costa Rica's unilateral rescheduling. 46 To enlighten the
judges on American policy, the U.S. Justice Department had filed a brief amicus
curiae, expressing concern that Costa Rica's unilateral rescheduling of its external
borrowing might interfere with multilateral initiatives to resolve the world debt crisis
and to provide equilibrium in the international balance of payments. Since the court
on rehearing found the Costa Rican decrees inconsistent with U.S. policy, comity did
not require their recognition. 47
The court's position in the rehearing seems clearly correct as a matter of policy.
To encourage new financing to debtor nations, commercial banks must have confidence in the reliability of cross-border credit agreements. This interest in general
world welfare, as well as American parochial national interest in the welfare of its
financial institutions, requires enforcement of freely accepted loan contracts. To
permit a foreign sovereign borrower to postpone a debt unilaterally would undermine
the relative certainty in international financial markets that forms the very basis of
transborder financial cooperation, by denying a lender's legal right to repayment.
The court on rehearing refused to apply not only the concept of comity, but also
the act of state defense. The prohibition on questioning a foreign act applies only as
the act affects property located within the foreign nation's territory. The property
subject to the Costa Rican decrees-the debt of the Costa Rican banks-was situated
outside Costa Rican borders. Therefore the court could call into question the validity
of the Costa Rican act without violating the act of state doctrine. It did just this, and
refused to recognize the validity of the decree.
Determining debt situs is not an easy exercise. 48 Intangibles, including the duty
to repay a loan, have no fixed location that can be determined the way one locates
physical property such as wood or a bill of lading. The debt may be evidenced merely
by an entry on a bank's books and in its computers.
An obligation to repay money might most logically be fixed in a country that has
power to enforce the debt. Normally the country where the debt is payable would be
44. Judges Meskill, Pierce, and Metzner.
45. Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 519.
47. Id.
48. A reporter's note to § 443 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States suggests
that it would be preferable to approach the applicability of the act of state doctrine to intangibles not by seeking a situs,
but by "determining how the act of the foreign state in the particular circumstances fits within the reasons for the act of
state doctrine and the territorial limitation." RESTATEMENT
(Tui.D) OFFOREIGN
RELATIONS
LAWOFTHEUNITEDSTATES§ 443
reporter's note 4 (1987).
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the country that has jurisdiction over the debtor. 49 Since the debtors in Allied Bank
were resident in Costa Rica, one might conclude that the debt had its situs in Costa
Rica.
The court in Allied Bank found to the contrary, however, because Costa Rica
could not completely extinguish the borrowers' obligations to pay dollars in New
York. The taking of property attempted by the decrees could not be accomplished
inside Costa Rica, because the debtors had agreed to payment in New York.
A similar reasoning about debt situs had been followed by the Second Circuit the
previous year in the case of Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank.50 Chase Manhattan
customers had sued to recover on peso certificates of deposit purchased in Cuba in
1958 and confiscated the next year by Castro's revolutionary government. Chase had
guaranteed repayment at any Chase branch worldwide, and could pay the certificate
of deposit in New York as well as in Havana.51 Although Chase had already turned
over to the Cuban government the amount of the certificate of deposit, the court said
that Chase had to pay again, this time to the depositor.52 It was as if an armed gunman
in Cuba had robbed the local branch of the bank and the head office had to bear the
consequences. The court was apparently influenced by the fact that Chase officials
had known that the safety of the funds was one of the principal purposes of its
relationship with the plaintiffs. In effect, the court read into the deposit agreement
what has been called a "last plane account" clause, by which in time of local national
crisis (when the customer escaped on the last plane for Miami) the money would be
53
transferred from the country of deposit to a safer haven.
Two days after this decision, the highest state court in New York reached a
contrary result in an almost identical set of facts involving the same bank but a
different depositor. In Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank54 the New York Court of
Appeals held that the act of state doctrine did apply to preclude inquiry into the

49. This is the rule of an eighty-year old U.S. Supreme Court case, Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (overruled
only as to the quasi-in-rem issue addressed in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)) (quoted recently by Judge Amalya
Kearse in the Wells Fargo case, discussed infra at note 56). Compare the Swiss position. With respect to payment of a
sum of money, the obligation is located, in the absence of a contrary agreement by the parties, at the residence of the
creditor. Other obligations generally are located at the debtor's residence at the time the obligations were created. Article
74 of the Swiss Code des Obligations provides:
Le lieu oa l'obligation doit 6tre exdcutde est d6termind par la volont6 expresse ou prdsume des parties. A d~faut
de stipulation contraire, les dispositions suivantes sont applicables:
I, Lorsqu'il s'agit d'une somme d'argent, le paiement s'optre dans le lieu oh le crdancier est domicili6 A
l'dpoque du paiement;
2. Lorsque l'obligation porte sur une chose ddterminde la chose est ddlivrde dans le lieu oit elle se trouvait au
temps de Ia conclusion du contrat;
3. Toute autre obligation est ex6cutde dans le lieu oh le ddbiteur 6tait domicilid lorsqu'elle a pris naissance.
CODE DES OBIGATIONS [Co.] art. 74 (Switz.).

For application of this principle, see the Swiss federal court decision in the Maritime International Nominees
Establishment v. Guinea, Judgment of Dec. 4, 1985, Tribunal fdddral, Switz., 5 ASA Bull. 24, 26 (1986).
50. 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 646.
52. Id. at 650-51.
53. Judge Amalya Kearse's dissent argued that the debt was located in Cuba (even if it was also located elsewhere)
because it could have been collected there. Consequently, she argued, the debt ceased to exist on payment to the
revolutionary government. Id. at 651-53.
54. 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1984).
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validity of the Cuban expropriation. The presence of a Chase branch in Cuba meant
the debt could be paid there. The fact that there were other countries where the
55
deposit could also have been paid was not relevant.
At first blush, the New York state decision seems the better one for the banking
industry. When deposits are confiscated, banks will pay only once, not twice. On
reflection,.however, this rule might boomerang for the bankers. Where the shoe is on
the other foot, and the American bank is the creditor of a foreign borrower, a rule that
locates debts wherever they can be paid would seem to increase the probability of a
court granting recognition to a foreign moratorium on payment.
In another recent case, Wells FargoAsia Ltd. v. Citibank,56 Citibank's Manila
branch had accepted deposits from foreign financial institutions, and those deposits
were frozen in 1983 by the Central Bank of the Philippines. Citibank's defense
included the act of state doctrine. The trial court ultimately held that New York was
the place of repayment; thus New York law would be applied in order to promote the
parties' shared expectations. The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Amalya
Kearse, affirmed the conclusion that Citibank was liable because the parties had
agreed to repayment in New York.
One commentator has expressed the opinion that the act of state doctrine should
not apply at all in a case like Allied Bank, regardless of debt situs. 57 The validity of
the foreign exchange control decrees, so the argument goes, is not in question.
Rather, the issue is the liability of the defaulting debtor. This point may be illustrated
at the level of an individual. If an American living in Paris claimed to be unable to
pay off the mortgage on his Cape Cod summer home because his French bank account
was blocked, an action by the lending bank to foreclose on the mortgage would not
call into question the validity of the French restrictions on the bank account. If the
loan could be repaid through sale of the house on Cape Cod (or other American
assets) the French restrictions would not be fatal to the foreclosing lender. A similar
reasoning could be applied to New York assets of foreign borrowers.
The practitioner pays attention to the act of state doctrine to protect his client.
The scholar, however, must look at the doctrine's wisdom from a more general
perspective. Whatever value the rule has in promoting security of title to tangible
goods, 58 its application to intangibles such as debt is open to question. Perhaps the
best conclusion to the matter is a quote from F.A. Mann, Britain's grand old man on
the legal aspects of money: "It must be hoped that the United States ... and England
... will rid themselves of a doctrine that is unknown in the rest of the world, is alien
to the judicial function, and should have no bearing on the effects of foreign exchange
59
control."

55. Id. at 470, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
56. 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), a.fg 695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See generally Smedresman &
Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, MultinationalBanks and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733, 762-74 (1989).
BANKiN
O ONTHEAct OF
57. Maier, Book Review, 21 Tax. INT'L L.J. 197, 201 (1985) (reviewing C. EBENROTH,
STATE(1985)).

58. See supra text following note 27.
59. Mann, 2 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 10, at 14 (1988/89).
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B. Sovereign Immunity6
The act of state doctrine was not the only potential legal obstacle to enforcing the
loan agreement against the Costa Rican banks. The district court in Allied Bank also
had to deal with the jurisdictional defense of sovereign immunity, 6' by which agencies of one sovereign nation cannot be hauled into the court of another. Immunity
from suit interacts with, but is distinct from, the act of state doctrine. Sovereign
immunity is not a choice of law rule but rather a limit on jurisdiction.
One rationale for sovereign immunity that commends itself is similar to the
justification for the act of state doctrine. In asserting jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign, the judiciary risks interfering with or hindering the executive branch of the
government in its conduct of international relations.
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (F.S.I.A.) grants immunity to foreign states unless one of several exceptions applies. A major exception
distinguishes between the state's public acts-actsjure imperii-andits commercial
acts-acts jure gestionis. Immunity from jurisdiction will not apply in cases arising
from the state's entry into the marketplace. This distinction between commercial
activity and public activity is at the root of what is referred to as the "restrictive"
theory of immunity, as contrasted with the older theory of complete or absolute
immunity with respect to all acts.
England followed an absolute immunity doctrine until the State Immunity Act of
1978 brought English law into line with that of the rest of the Western world. A
"restrictive" view of immunity in England now limits immunity when the state has
entered into a commercial transaction. The Act defines commercial transaction to
include "any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance" and any guar62
antee of a financial transaction.
The Swiss have added a wrinkle to their immunity doctrine by requiring a
connection between the foreign act and Switzerland. The concept of binnenbeziehung
(internal connection) was used to defend against attachment of assets in Switzerland
to satisfy an arbitral award rendered against Libya in a dispute whose subject matter
63
was unconnected to Switzerland.
Not surprisingly, communist legal systems generally do not consider economic
activities to be any less entitled to the prerogatives of a sovereign than noneconomic
functions. As a matter of internal law, however, Soviet agencies are generally amenable to judicial and arbitral dispute resolution. 64 Nevertheless, communist concepIMMUNITY (1984); Delaume, Sovereign Immunity andPublicDebt,23 INrr'L LAW.
60. See generallyG. BADR, STATE
811 (1989). For a European perspective, see Reymond, Souverainet de L'ttat et Participationiil'Arbitrage, 1985 REvuE
DEL'ARBfrrAE 517 (1985).
61. Allied Bank 1, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
62. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3(3)(b). In contrast, the absolute theory of sovereign immunity is
illustrated by a British case of the last century, Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [ 1894] 1 Q.B. 149 (C.A.). Under an assumed
name the Sultan had proposed marriage. When he later changed his mind, the woman sued him for breach of promise.
Id. The Sultan successfully escaped the consequences of his rash proposal by pleading sovereign immunity. Id. at 151,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 325-29 (3d ed. 1979).
PRINCIPLES OFPUBLIC
153-54, 156, 160, 161,164. See generallyI. BROWNLUE,
63. See the Swiss federal court decision in the "LIAMCO" saga. Judgment of June 19, 1980, Tribunal fdral,
15 (1981) (introductory note by Georges Delaume)
Switz., 106 B.G.E. 1. 142 (1980), reprintedin, 20 It"L L. MATERIALS
(English translation submitted to U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir., in Nos. 80-1207 and 80-1252 (LIAMCO v. Libya)).
& P. MAGs, SovIET LEGAL
Sysrst 244-47 (3d ed. 1977). On arbitration
64. See, e.g., J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER
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tions of the role of the state see nothing unusual about a state descending into the
marketplace. 65
Returning to U.S. law, we note that the relevant statutory language setting forth
the restrictive theory of the F.S.I.A. reads in part as follows:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or
of the States in any case... in which the action is based upon.., an act outside the territory
of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state ... and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States.66
There appears to be no consensus on characterization of the act-determining
whether the act is commercial or governmental. In some societies the purchase of
boots by the army, or wheat for the general population, might each be viewed as a
public act, even though any merchant can purchase boots or wheat. To elaborate the
concept of commercial activity one must make value judgments about the proper role
of government. 67
Whether or not an activity is commercial is determined under the F.S.I.A. by the
nature of the transaction, not by its purpose. 68 This general principle is amplified by
a helpful legislative history. The report of the House Judiciary Committee reads as
follows:
Moreover, both a sale of bonds to the public and a direct loan from a U.S. commercial bank
to a foreign government are activities which are of a commercial nature and should be treated
like other similar commercial transactions. Such commercial activities would not otherwise
give rise to immunity and would be subject to U.S. regulation, such as that provided by the
securities laws. 69
The execution of promissory notes, therefore, is a commercial activity.
The term "foreign state" in the F.S.I.A. includes a state "agency or instrumentality" (what the French might call an "6manation"). 70 A corporate entity that
is a separate legal person, but whose shares are owned by the foreign state, would
therefore be entitled to immunity.
Having cleared the hurdle of immunity from suit, the lender still has to enforce
judgment
in its favor. Immunity from jurisdiction is distinct from immunity from
any
execution. The law provides only meager exceptions to the rule prohibiting attachment or execution against the property of a foreign state. For example, property used
with Soviet and East European agencies, see Pechota, InternationalEconomic Arbitration in the USSR and Eastern
Europe, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L COMP.L. 377 (1987).
65. See memorandum presented by Professor Ushakov, entitled Jurisdiction Immunities of States and Their
Property,U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/371 (11 May 1983) (copy on file at Ohio State Law Journal). See generally I. BRoWNLtE,
ANDThE LAWtN THE PEOPa's REPUBtC OF CHINA 547-48
supra note 62, at 547-48. See also FOREION TRADE, INVESTMENT
(M. Moser ed. 1987).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982).
67. See Leacock, The Commercial Activity Exception to the Act of State Doctrine Revisited: Evolution of a
Concept, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 1 (1988).
68. A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982).
69. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1976).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a) & (b) (1982).
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in the commercial activity on which the claim is based will not be immune. Some
property, such as central bank funds (absent an explicit waiver of immunity), is
always immune except perhaps if the central bank functions as a commercial bank in
a particular transaction.
With forethought, lenders can meet at least one risk of sovereign debt by negotiating renunciation of immunity. The sovereign immunity defense does not apply
when the foreign state has expressly or implicitly waived its immunity, and express
waivers of immunity apparently are the rule in international lending transactions. 71
Moreover, 1988 amendments to the F.S.I.A. provide that a foreign state generally
will not be immune from jurisdiction in an action to enforce arbitration agreements
72
or to confirm arbitral awards.
Of course, a sovereign borrower's loss on jurisdictional immunity is not necessarily fatal to its defense. As already discussed, the finding of nonimmunity may
become a meaningless exercise when the act of state doctrine applies. 73 Just as
important, an American court that has jurisdiction under the terms of the F.S.I.A
must still have personal jurisdiction in the form of minimum contacts with the foreign
entity. 74
C. The InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement75
The International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement add yet another consideration in recovery against a defaulting borrower subject to exchange controls. To
reduce distortion of transnational trade and finance, the Fund's Articles of Agreement
prohibit restrictions on "current" transactions without Fund approval. 76 Cur71. § 1605(a)(1). See Rendell, supra note 35. See generally Delaume, supra note 60.
72. The amendment provides that a foreign state does not enjoy immunity in any case:
In which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign State with or for the benefit
of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between
the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant
to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take place in the United
States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force
for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim,
save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United States court under this section or section
1607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(6) (West Supp. 1989).
73. For this reason the American Bar Association in 1984 adopted a resolution that would amend § 1606 to provide:
(b) The federal act of state doctrine shall not be applied on behalf of a foreign state with respect to any claim
or counterclaim asserted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter which is based upon an expropriation or other
taking of property (including contract rights) without the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation or otherwise in violation of international law or which is based upon a breach of contract.
Senator Mathias sponsored legislation to this effect in 1985. S. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
74. See International Housing v. Rafidian Bank, 712 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also INT'L FIN. L. R-v.,
Aug. 1989, at 39.
75. See generallyF. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT
OFMONEY 372-400 (4th ed. 1982); Ebke, Article VIII, Section 2(b),
InternationalMonetary Cooperationandthe Courts, 23 INT'L LAW. 677 (1989); Zamora, supra note 32, at 1063-69. See
also Sandrock, Are Disputes Over the Application of Article VIII (2)(b) of the IMF Treaty Arbitrable? 23 INT'L LAW 933
(1989) (concluding that in most contexts Article VII (2)(b) issues will be arbitrable under U.S. and West German law).
76. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. vInl(2)(a), 60 Stat. 1401, 1411,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 66, incorporatedwith same words, Second Amendment to the IMF Articles, Apr.
1, 1978, 29 U.S.T.S. 2203, 2223, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 [hereinafter IMF Articles and Second Amendment to IMF Articles
respectively].
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rent transactions are defined as payments other than those for the transfer of capital
and include:
1. payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including
services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
2. payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;
3. payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct
investments .... 77
The same article that prohibits restrictions on current transactions also requires
member countries to enforce each others' exchange controls when imposed consistently with the IMF Agreement. Article VIII(2)(b) provides:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to
the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with
this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member. 78
As a member of the Fund, the United States must respect another member's
foreign exchange controls even if they prevent foreign borrowers from repaying loans
to American banks. This obligation will apply if the loan agreement is deemed to
constitute an "exchange contract," and if the exchange controls are imposed consistently with the IMF Agreement, which is to say approved by the IMF or imposed
on capital rather than current transactions.
As one might suspect, scholarly and judicial opinions are not unanimous as to
what constitutes an exchange contract or what exchange controls are consistent with
the IMF Agreement. Both questions were dealt with in Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional .79 In Libra Bank, a $40 million loan from a syndicate headed by a British bank
to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica was intended to finance sugar production and
exports. 80 On default, consequent to the same exchange control decrees at issue in
Allied Bank, suit against the borrowers was brought in New York. 8' Because the loan
was found to have its situs outside Costa Rica, the act of state doctrine did not operate
as a defense to payment. 8 2 Nor did the doctrine of comity apply to protect the
borrower, since the Costa Rican exchange control decrees constituted a confiscation
of property without compensation, repugnant to the U.S. Constitution and laws. After
judgment for the lender, the Banco Nacional asked to reargue the case on the basis
that the loans were "exchange contracts" and that the Costa Rican decrees were
83
exchange control regulations imposed consistently with the IMF Agreement.
The Court rejected both contentions. First, it gave a narrow interpretation to the
word exchange contract, to include swaps of one currency against another but not to
include all contracts involving monetary elements. The court rejected a broader view,

77. Second Amendment to IMF Articles, Apr. 1, 1978, art. XXX, part d, 29 U.S.T.S. 2203, 2257-58.
78. IMF Articles, art. VIll(2)(b), 60 Stat. at 1411, 2 U.N.T.S. at 66, incorporatedwith same words, Second
Amendment to I.M.F. Articles, 29 U.S.T.S. at 2223.
79. 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
80. Id. at 874.
81. Id. at 875.
82. Id. at 882.
83. Id. at 846.
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suggested by the then General Counsel of the IMF, that an exchange contract includes
any agreement between resident and nonresident calling for payment or transfer in
currency whether domestic or foreign that can affect the member state's balance of
payments. 84
The Court in Libra Bank also found that Costa Rica had not borne its burden of
showing that its exchange controls were imposed consistently with the IMF Articles,
which would have meant either that the Fund approved the restrictions or else that the
85
restrictions applied to capital rather than current transactions.
D. ArbitrationAgreements
An arbitration clause in the loan agreement is an intriguing prospect for lenders
concerned with both sovereign immunity and the act of state defense. The arbitration
clause could provide that disputes arising out of the loan will be settled by the
arbitration rules of an institution such as the International Chamber of Commerce, 86 the London Court of International Arbitration, 87 or the American Arbitration
Association. 88
Arbitration agreements are one variety of forum selection clause, 89 and under
American law will normally be enforced in international contracts. The line of Supreme Court cases in which forum selection clauses have been upheld goes back
seventeen years to a case that involved reference to the High Court of London in a
contract between a German and an American company. 90 Subsequently the Court
explicitly extended its recognition of international forum selection clauses to arbitration agreements even if the contracts involved legal issues that could not have been
arbitrated in a domestic context. 9' In 1985, the Supreme Court announced in a

84. Id. at 899, 901. For Joseph Gold's narrow view of "exchange contract," see J. GOLD,Tn FUND AGREEMErr
INTHECOURTS,
VOLUMIE
II 281 (1982).
The broader view of the term "exchange contract" was also used to support the position of the United States in 1979
when President Carter froze Iranian dollar deposits in foreign branches of American banks under the International
Economic Emergency Powers Act.
85. Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 902. A narrow view of exchange contracts was also taken in England by the House
of Lords in United City Merchants v. Royal Bank, [1983] A.C. 168. The case involved a letter of credit to finance a sale
of equipment to a Peruvian company in violation of Peruvian exchange control regulations. Lord Diplock stated that an
exchange contract was "confined to contracts to exchange the currency of one country for the currency of another ....
Id. at 188.
86. See generally W. CRAIG, W. PARK, & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (2d

ed. 1990) [hereinafter I.C.C. ARBrmATiON].
87. See A Commentary on theRules of the London Court of InternationalArbitration, 10 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 167
(1985).
88. See A.A.A. SUPPLESIETrARY PROCEDURES
FORINTERNATIONAL CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1986); R. CAULSON,
BUsiNEsS ARBrrATION: WHAT You NEED To KNow (3rd ed. 1986).

89. On the danger of failing to select a forum in advance of the dispute, see Amin Rasheed Corp. v. Kuwait
Insurance, [1984] 1 A.C. 50 (H.L.(E)), involving a Kuwaiti insurance company that had insured a cargo vessel owned
by a Liberian corporation. In an action brought by the Liberian corporation, English courts refused to grant leave to serve
process against the Kuwaiti defendant under R.S.C. Order 11.
90. Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (oil rig towed from Louisiana to Italy).
91. Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 5067 (1974). The case involved securities law issues. At the time,
arbitration of most securities law issues was considered a violation of American public policy. Recent Supreme Court
decisions have permitted arbitration of securities law cases, even in noninternational cases. See Rodrigues de Quijas v.
Shearson, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
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landmark case 92 that arbitration agreements will be enforced in international contracts
even if the claims relate to fundamental, or "core," public policy issues such as those
raised by antitrust laws that may not be arbitrable in a domestic context. 93
Traditionally, arbitration has not been considered suitable for credit agreements.
It may end up being a long, complicated, and expensive process even when nothing
significant is in dispute except the borrower's willingness or ability to pay on a
promissory note. Moreover, the arbitration agreement might impede the lender from
using an expedited or summary procedure available in many national legal systems,
such as the droit cambiairein France, under which court-ordered payment procedures
94
simplify and accelerate the enforcement of commercial paper obligations.
Arbitration, however, has a special raisond'etre when loans involve foreign debt,
because of the risk of defenses based on the act of state or sovereign immunity
doctrines. 95 Moreover, arbitration has a role to play with respect to the debt-equity
96
swaps discussed below.
In 1988, two federal statutes were amended to give greater enforceability to
arbitration agreements and awards involving foreign sovereigns. These are sometimes
referred to as the "LIAMCO Amendments," because they clarified issues addressed
in Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libya, 97 where sovereign immunity and the act of state
92. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
93. See generally Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope of International
Arbitration, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 629 (1986).
94. The holder requests the Tribunal de Commerce to grant the order to pay, which will be served upon the debtor.
After 30 days from the service, attachment will be granted if the holder asks the Tribunal to enforce the order. The debtor
may file an objection during the 30-day period requiring the Tribunal to judge the validity of the note, which in practice
takes less than a month. Under the American law the "holder in due course" of a negotiable instrument benefits from
presumptions of validity as to a number of matters such as the genuineness of signature. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305,
3-307 (1977).
95. See Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D. D.C. 1980),
vacated, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ad hoe arbitration in Geneva); Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic, 465
F. Supp. 824 (D. D.C. 1978) (arbitration of International Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland). See generallyDelaume,
State Contractsand TransnationalArbitration, 75 Am. J. IrNr'L L. 784 (198 1). On the related question of whether a state
may avoid arbitration by relying on provisions of its own law prohibiting arbitration with a private party, see Paulsson,
May a State Invoke Its Internal Law to Repudiate Consent to InternationalCommercial Arbitration (Reflexions on
Benteler v. Belgium), 2 ARB. Irrr'L 90 (1986).
American courts have for some time found that arbitration clauses constitute implied waivers of jurisdictional
immunity. The F.S.I.A. grants courts jurisdiciton when the foreign state has "waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication." Some cases have required not only waiver, but also a clear connection between the lawsuit and the United
States to provide minimum contacts over the parties, so as to satisfy the due process clause of the Constitution when the
award is enforced. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1981) (The appeals court affirmed the district court's dismissal of an anticipatory breach action against Nigeria's central
bank, but did so on constitutional, not statutory grounds.), rev'd, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (The Supreme Court reversed
the appeals court's constitutional theory and remanded to the appeals court for review of the district court's finding
of a statutory lack of jurisdiction.). See also International Housing v. Rafidian Bank, 712 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
96. See infra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
97. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980). The New York Arbitration Convention permits refusal of recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award if the subject matter of the difference is "not capable of settlement by arbitration." In
Libyan Am. Oil, this defense was invoked successfully in proceedings to enforce an award resulting from nationalization
of an American oil concession by Libya. The court held the nationaliation to be a nonarbitrable subject matter because
of the act of state doctrine. Since American courts would not judge the validity of a nationalization, the D.C. District
Court would not enforce an award of arbitrators who had done so.
The correctness of the LIAMCO decision was questionable. The court was asked to enforce an award, not to pass
on the validity of a foreign nationalization. The decision, vacated because of settlement between the parties, was
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doctrine were raised as defenses to the enforcement of an arbitral award against Libya
in a dispute arising out of the nationalization by Libya of American owned oil
concessions. 98
The Federal Arbitration Act now provides that "[e]nforcement of arbitral agreements, confirmation of arbitral awards, and execution upon judgments based on
orders confirming such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State
doctrine." 99 The F.S.I.A, as already mentioned, now generally denies a foreign state
immunity from the jurisdiction of American courts in an action to enforce an arbitration agreement or to confirm an arbitral award.' to Moreover, arbitration agreements have been held to constitute waivers of immunity in many countries even in the
absence of special legislation. ' 0'
Arbitration agreements and awards are also enforceable under the 1958 New York
Arbitration Convention, which has been ratified by more than seventy countries
including the United States, the Soviet Union, most Western industrialized countries,
and many developing countries.' 0 2 The Convention requires recognition of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate and the arbitrator's award. Thus the Convention gives parties
to international contracts some hope that they may avoid the "home town justice" that
might be meted out in foreign courts. The Convention contains a litany of limited
defenses to enforcement of awards, designed to insure the basic procedural integrity
of the arbitral process and the award's conformity with notions of fundamental public
03
order.

effectively ignored six months later by a federal court in the same district, American International Group v. Iran, 493 F.
Supp. 522 (D. D.C. 1980) enforcing an arbitral award in favor of insurance companies whose businesses in Iran had been
nationalized. In light of the 1988 Amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act, LIAMCO would have to be decided
differently today. 9 U.S.C.A. § 15 (Vest Supp. 1989) (Note that the Congress enacted two provisions to be codified at
9 U.S.C. § 15, one concerning inapplicability of the act of state doctrine in judicial enforcement of arbitral awards, and
the other relating to appealability of court orders pursuant to arbitral awards.).
98. See generallyKahale, New Legislation in the U.S. FacilitatesEnforcement ofArbitralAgreements andAwards
Against ForeignSovereigns, 6 J. INTr'L
ARB. 57 (1989).
99. 9 U.S.C.A. § 15 ('West Supp. 1989). Compare § 9 of the British State Immunity Act of 1978, providing that
when a state has agreed to arbitration in writing, that state is not immune with respect to court proceedings related to the
arbitration. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 9.
100. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(6) (West Supp. 1989). For the text of the statute, see supra note 72. The scope of the
Amendment includes arbitration agreements and awards covered by the New York Convention and arbitrations that take
place in the United States.
101. See, e.g, Judgment of Nov. 18, 1986, Cour de cass. (France) (Etat frangais v. S.E.E. E.), reprintedin 76 REv.
CeRI.DRorr INT'L. PRtvi 786 (1987); see also accompanying note by P. Mayer.
102. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.S.
2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Arbitration Convention]; Act approved July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9 U.S.C. ch. 2 (1988) (the implementing legislation in the United States). See generally
Aksen, American Arbitration Association Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations
Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. REv. 1 (1971); McMahon,
Implementation of the UnitedNations Convention on ForeignArbitralAwards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & Co.i.
735 (1971); Quigley, Accession by the UnitedStates to the UnitedNations Convention on the Recognition andEnforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961); Van Mehren, The Enforcement of ArbitralAwards Under
Conventions and UnitedStates Law, 9 YALE J. \voRto PuB. ORO.343 (1983). See also I.C.C. ARBrMATION, supra note
86, ch. 37; A. vAN DENBERG, THE NEw YoRK ARBITRATION CoNvENmoN oF 1958 (1981).
103. 1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom
it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is
sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some
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American enthusiasm for arbitration agreements and awards has not been shared
by developing countries. In 1974, notions of a "New International Economic Order"
were incorporated into a United Nations General Assembly Resolution entitled The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.t 0 4 Presumably the Charter would
apply to disputes relating to debt swapped for equity, as outlined below.
The Charter rejected the principle that compensation for expropriation of foreignowned property should be determined according to neutral international tribunals.
Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter requires compensation for nationalized property to be
determined solely by host-state courts, which effectively excludes neutral arbitration:
In any case where the question of compensation [for expropriated property] gives rise to a
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its
tribunals ....

0s

This part of the Charter has been rejected as not legally binding by at least one
arbitrator in a dispute concerning the Libyan government's nationalizations of properties owned by Texaco and Standard Oil of California. 106
The provisions of Article 2(2)(c) echo the doctrine that bears the name of the
nineteenth century Argentinean jurist, Carlos Calvo, who proposed a general principle of equal treatment for Latin American nationals and foreign investors. The
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission
to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration,
provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, that part of the award which contain[s] decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
(2) Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.
Arbitration Convention, art. V, 21 U.S.T.S. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40-42.
See generally Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integri y in International
Arbitration, 63 TuLANE L. REv. 647 (1989).
104. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974). Adopted by a vote of 120
to 6 (with 10 abstentions). The negative votes were cast by Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Charter was essentially the work of the developing nations
that hoped to give legal form to the economic aspirations articulated during the previous decade through the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
105. Id.
106. See International Arbitral Tribunal: Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texas Overseas Petroleum
Company/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 lrr'L L. MATuAs.s 1
(1978). The Libyan government argued that the principles of the New International Economic Order precluded the
jurisdiction of any international tribunal. Professor Rend-Jean Dupuy, the arbitrator, however, found that the principles
of Article 2(2)(c) did not represent the general will of the community of nations, and denied their legal effect. Had Article
2(2)(c) been deemed legally binding by the arbitrator, with retroactive effect, the arbitrator would have been without
jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and the companies' only recourse would have been before Libyan national courts.
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Calvo doctrine finds its embodiment in legislative and constitutional provisions of
many Latin American countries granting exclusive jurisdiction to local courts.'0 7 A
Latin American court therefore could strike down a forum selection clause violative
of the local statutory enactment of the Calvo doctrine. An arbitral tribunal itself,
however, might react differently to such a public policy.
An arbitration agreement, as already mentioned, is only one variety of forum
selection clause. Dispute resolution by a neutral country court is also an option. Fear
of judges' national prejudices or predispositions, however, may prevent the parties
from agreeing on a national court to hear their dispute. Lawyers from companies
based in industrialized nations may lack confidence in judges from countries without
a tradition of judicial independence. Developing nations may resist reference to
courts of former colonial powers, despite their legal and commercial sophistication.
Just as importantly, one cannot always be certain in advance that a foreign
national court will accept jurisdiction. Many courts will not accept jurisdiction of
disputes between foreign parties without a connection between the dispute and the
country of the forum.' 0 3 No such limits are likely to arise if the parties refer to
arbitration.
Only English Courts, to the best of my knowledge, have shown themselves
enthusiastic toward taking jurisdiction pursuant to forum selection clauses covering
disputes between foreign parties concerning controverted events occurring abroad. In
a dispute arising from a collision between Dutch and Belgian vessels in Belgian
waters, the eminent Lord Denning ruled that the English Admiralty Court could
accept the election of one of the parties to bring an action in England. "You may call
American Loans, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Ocr. 1985, at 31.
107. See Leavy, The Cah'o Doctrine in Latin
108. For example, New York limits the right of a foreign corporation to bring an action against another foreign
corporation. N.Y. Bus. ConP. LAW § 1314 (McKinney 1989) provides:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this article, an action or special proceeding against a foreign corporation (not
formed under the laws of the United States and maintaining an office in New York] may be maintained by
another foreign corporation... in the following cases only:
(1) Where it is brought to recover damages for the breach of a contract made or to be performed within this state,
or relating to property situated within this state at the time of the making of the contract.
(2) Where the subject matter of the litigation is situated within this state.
(3) Where the cause of action arose within this state ....
(4) Where... a non-domiciliary would be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of [New York under
its long arm statute].
(5) Where the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business or authorized to do business in the state.
Id.
N.Y. BANKING
LAw § 200-b (MeKinney 1989) contains similar limits related to actions against foreign banks.
The effect of both on this rule was modified in 1984 by the enactment of Section 5-1402 of the N.Y. General
Obligation Law, which provides:
[Any person may maintain an action or proceeding against a foreign corporation, non-resident, or foreign state
where the action or proceeding arises out of or relates to any contract, agreement or undertaking for which a
choice of New York law has been made ...and which (a) is a contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent
or otherwise, in consideration of, or relating to any obligation arising out of a transaction covering in the
aggregate, not less than one million dollars, and (b) which contains a provision or provisions whereby such
foreign corporation or non-resident agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
N.Y. GEN. Oimuo. LAw § 5-1402 (McKinney 1989). N.Y.C.P.L.R Rule 327 provides that actions shall not be dismissed
for forum non conveniens when § 5-1402 applies and the parties have selected New York law.
Moreover, § 5-1401 provides that whenever a transaction involves more than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars,
the parties may submit their contractual rights and duties to New York law regardless of whether their agreement has any
reasonable relationship to New York state. N.Y. GEN. OBUo. L. § 5-1401 (McKinney 1989).
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this 'forum shopping' if you please," wrote Denning, "but if the forum is England,
it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the goods and the speed of
service." 109
If bankers do swap loans for equity participation in the local borrower, as
discussed in the next section, arbitral resolution of disputes might proceed under the
rules of the private institutions already mentioned. 110 In addition, the World Bank's
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) would also be an
option.1 1 t Here as elsewhere, the mechanics of both the problem and its solution
involve several interdependent conceptual elements.
E. Restructuring, Securitization, and Debt-Equity Swaps112
When American commercial banks with foreign loan portfolios received the
shock of the 1982 Mexico moratorium on its payments of debt principal," 3 the
bankers responded by trying to reschedule debt coming due in the short term. The
lenders, the borrowers, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) succeeded in
working out terms that allowed at least some of the immediately due commercial debt
to be restructured. 114 Later some debtors and their creditors undertook to reschedule
loans coming due in the medium term.
Negotiated with the best of intentions on all sides, these restructurings have not
provided a satisfactory solution to the debt crisis. For example, the first major
rescheduling of Brazilian debt took place in February, 1983. A condition of that
rescheduling was that Brazil sign an agreement with the IMF requiring adherence to
an economic austerity program. Brazil failed to meet the IMF economic performance
targets, the terms of the rescheduling had to be renegotiated, and additional austerity
programs had to be implemented. t1 5 The failure of some debtors to meet even the

109. The Atlantic Star, [1973] 1 Q.B. 364, 382 (C.A.). Maritime collisions, of course, may present a special
situation because of the peculiar nature of admiralty in rem actions. In the absence of a valid forum selection clause,
relevant jurisdictional rules are found in R.S.C. Order I1,which gives English courts jurisdiction, inter alia, to enforce
contracts governed by English law. For English rules on forum non conveniens, see Spiliada Maritime v. Cansulex,
[1987] A.C. 460, holding that a stay of litigation will be granted when another competent forum is available and England
is not the natural or appropriate forum. See generally A. DuCEY & J. MORis, THE CoNFticr OF LAws 393-95 (11th ed.
Supp. 1989).
110. For example, the American Arbitration Association, the International Chamber of Commerce, or the London
Court of International Arbitration. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
I11.ICSID arbitration has its own enforcement mechanism. An ICSID arbitration award rendered under the aegis
of the World Bank might not be enforced in countries where sovereign immunity otherwise posed an obstacle. The ICSID
treaty does not prevent a sovereign immunity defense under the law of the country executing the award. Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, openedfor signatureMar. 18, 1965, art. 55, 17 U.S.T.S. 1270, 1292, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 194.
112. For a survey of debt reduction techniques, see Quale, New Approaches to LDC Debt Restructuring and
Disposition: U.S. Legal and Accounting Considerations,23 Imr'L
LAw. 605 (1989).
113. See Mexico Seeks to Stop Paying Debt Principal,wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1982, at 2, col. 2.
114. See generallyReisner, Gruson & Thomas, InternationalBanking Symposium: Foreword, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REv.
219, 222.
115. See generally Zimbler, Debtor Law and Default: Enforcement of Foreign Loan Agreements in Brazilian
Courts, 17 U. Miimt INTER-A t. L. REv. 509 (1986). See Deposit Facility Agreement Between Banco Central do Brasil
and Republica Federativa do Brasil (as Guarantor, and Citibank N.A. (as
Agent)) et al., Feb. 23, 1983, and a subsequent
agreement between the same parties, Jan. 27, 1984.
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rescheduled terms has led to a series of restructurings' 1 6 that assumes the banks will
continually roll over the principal if the debtor keeps interest current and agrees to an
17
economic adjustment program.'
Restructurings bring problems of their own. The interest burden that results from
these arrangements usually dampens hope of economic recovery by debtor countries.
The drain on their foreign currency earnings leaves many developing countries in
what has been called a "kind of financial coma.""18 Moreover, commercial lenders
are understandably less than eager to make the new loans required by the debtor
economies. Rescheduling does not meet the debtor's needs for new money. The
banks are thus forced to confront the prospect of voluntary restraint and the writing
down of their foreign loans.
The political ramifications of supervision of debtor country economies monitored by foreign banks or the IMF are likewise not appealing as a permanent
solution. 119 Wrenching economic programs undertaken in order to prove that the
debtors are becoming better credit risks serve as first-aid during the initial shock but
become unsatisfactory as long-term treatment. If principal owed by debtor countries
remains at its current high level, no financial legerdemain or accountants' jiggerypokery will succeed in reducing the pain of debt service.
The inadequacy of restructuring as a solution to the world debt problem has led
to other techniques geared primarily towards debt reduction. The first is debt securitization.120 This technique repackages developing country loans into financial instruments such as bonds, which the creditor banks can market to third-party investors.
The engine driving securitization for the debtor is the discount off the initial
value of the debt. It is a straight debt-for-debt swap, with the added attraction for the
lender of a guarantee on principal and, for the Brady Plan, on interest as well.
Morgan Guaranty put forth such an "exit bond" plan for Mexico that involved the
replacement of existing debt, at a discount, with Mexican securities.121 The principal
of the new securities would be guaranteed by twenty-year zero-coupon U.S. Treasury
bonds held in escrow by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Mexico intended to
pay two billion dollars out of its foreign currency reserves to purchase U.S. Treasury
zero-coupon bonds worth ten billion dollars at maturity in 2008, and to auction its
own securities to those banks offering the greatest discount on existing debt. In this
22
way, Mexico could potentially retire a substantial portion of its debt.1

July 8, 1989, at 72.
116. Repeat Performance,THE Eco.o.Ni-sT,
117. Buchheit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 1988 U. Iu. L. REv. 371, 373.
118. Id. at 374.
119. For example, the President of Peru is reported to have urged the largest debtor nations to stop payments in a
"financial disarmament" plan. Boston Globe, Sept. 5, 1989, at 16, col. 1. (report on Belgrade annual meeting of
nonalligned movement).
120. See Plehn, Securitization of Third World Debt, 23 INTL LAw. 161 (1989).
121. The plan's longer title was "Invitation from Gustavo Petrocelli, Minister of Finance and Public Credit of the
United Mexican States to the Banks Party to Mexico's Public Sector Restructure and New Restructure Agreements and
1983 and 1984 New Money Agreements to Exchange Existing Indebtedness For United Mexican States Collateralized
Floating Rate Bonds Due 2008 (Jan 18, 1988)." See Guenther, Here Are Main Points of Planfor Mexico to Reduce its
Debt by Billions of Dollars, Wall St. J.,Dec. 30, 1987, at 6.
122. Plehn, supra note 120, at 163-64.
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23

$10 billion face value
zero-coupon notes
maturing in 20 years

RESERVE

US

TREASURY

Principal of Mexican
secutrities maturing In
20 years collateralized
by Federal Reserve's
holding of U.S. T-Notes

$10 billion face value
Mexican government
maturing
securities
20 years and
bearingin
interest at LIBOR + 1.625%

BANKS

$2 billion

MEIA

GOVERNMENT
$20 billion face value
short-term loan
participations bearing
interest at LIBOR + .8125%

Unfortunately, however, the auction did not go as well as Mexico hoped. The
bids discounted the existing debt at an average of thirty percent, rather than the
hoped-for fifty percent, and only $3.67 billion of old debt was exchanged for $2.56
billion in new. 124 Furthermore, a year and a half later, the bonds apparently are
trading at a 25% discount due to continued uncertainty about the Mexican's ability to
pay the unsecured interest. 125
Another version of debt securitization was attempted under the auspices of the
so-called Brady Plan. To encourage bankers to make new loans, the Mexicans offered
exit options. First, the Mexicans would swap loans at face value for 30-year bonds
paying a below-market rate of 6.25% yearly interest. Alternatively, the banks could
swap their loans at a 35% discount for 30-year bonds paying a market interest rate.
As was the case for the Morgan Plan, the principal of the bonds was backed by
zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds, financed by a loan from the IMF. Interest was also
guaranteed up to a point to be determined by the amount of new loans received. 126
The recent decision by J.P. Morgan to increase its loan loss reserve to 100% of
its medium and long term debt portfolio has been interpreted as the death of the Brady
Plan. 127 Increased reserves mean that banks will make lending decisions as they wish,
based on the borrower's economic outlook rather than political considerations.
123. See Price Waterhouse Study: Regulatory Accounting and Tax Aspects for Sovereign Risk Lending, September
1989, at page 7. The Mexicans assumed a 50% reduction, but in the end were disappointed.
124. Plehn, supra note 120, at 164. The amount sold was limited by the Mexicans, who refused to accept bids that
insufficiently discounted the existing loans.
125. Mexico's Bankers Head for the Border, THE EcONOMIST, Aug. 12, 1989, at 63.
126. For example, Midland Bank of Britain, with $1.7 billion in loans outstanding, the third largest lender to Mexico
after Bank of America and Citicorp, has raised its reserves to 50% of its LDC debt portfolio of $7 billion and will probably
take the exit options and make no further loans to Mexico. Id.
127. See Whalen, supra note 1.
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Another debt reduction technique is the debt-equity swap. 128 Soon after the
world debt crisis gained public attention the legal correspondent to the Financial
Times speculated that:
The only alternative to exposing the holes left by unpaid and unrecoverable debts in bank
balances is the conversion of these debts into very long investment loans or, better still, into
equity....
The difficulty lies ... [in that] there is still no satisfactory system of legal protection for
foreign investments in developing countries whose regimes are unstable and whose economic policies are volatile .... 129
30
The equity, of course, might be expropriated. Arbitration, as discussed earlier,
would be one preferred means for settling disputes if the alternative is the borrower's
local courts, or if the sovereign immunity and act of state defenses might otherwise
protect the defaulting borrower.
Swaps involve the purchase, at a discount in hard currency, of a loan by a private
investor which trades it in with the debtor country for the equivalent, at face value or
nearly so, in local currency of the debtor country. The local currency is then invested
in a local enterprise, often a subsidiary of the foreign investor. The foreign investor
thus obtains local currency at an attractive rate, based on the secondary debt market
level.' 3 1 The bank cashes out its questionable loan at a discount. The debtor country
simultaneously reduces its external debt and encourages foreign investment.
For example, American Express Company might purchase Mexican debt at a
discount and use the equivalent face value of local currency to pay the local currency
bills of its credit card customers.1 32 Conservation groups such as the World Wildlife
Fund might purchase debt that is exchanged for local currency used to protect South
33
American parks and reserves. 1
The bank itself might trade its loan for an equity interest in a local enterprise in
a bilateral exchange. The Federal Reserve Board has issued regulations permitting
United States bank holding companies and their subsidiaries to enter into debt-equity

exchanges within limits. 134 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has also set

forth guidelines for such exchanges.

15

If banks with significant loans to sovereign

128. See generally Note, Debt-Equity Swapping:Reconsidering Accounting Guidelines, 26 COLUt1,.
J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 377 (1988); Note, InternationalDebt:Debt to Equity Swaps, 28 HARV. IrT'L L.J. 507 (1987) [hereinafter International
Debt]; Note, Debt for Equity Swaps in Mexico, 23 TEx. INr'L L. REv. 443 (1988) [hereinafter Mexico]; Note, Give Me
Equity or Give Me Debt, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 89 (1988). For the Chilean program, see World Bank: Report on
Chilean Debt Conversion With Chilean Rules on Investments With ForeignDebt Instruments and Provision in a Debt
RestructiringAgreementfor Such Investments, 26 INT'L L. MATERIAL 819 (1987). For the Brazilian program, see generally
Paes, Brazil's Debt to Equity Swap Program, 23 INT'L LAW. 533 (1989).
129. Hermann, A Way to Rescue the Bankers, Financial Times, Sept. 16, 1983, at 22, cols. 1-3.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 86-111.
131. For example, as of October 1988, Chilean debt was trading at 57% of its face value, Mexican debt at 46% of
its face value, and Brazilian debt at 42% of its face value. InternationalDebt, supra note 128.
132. See AmexCo Seeks to Use Mexico's Debt, Int'l Herald Tribune, Jan. 14, 1988, at 9, col. 2.
133. News Release of World Wildlife Federation, Dec. 14, 1977 (concerning $1 million swap for parks in the
Andes, Aragon, and Galapagos).
134. See Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f) (1989).
135. See No Objection Letter 87-10, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,039 (Nov. 27, 1987).
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borrowers participate actively in debt-equity swaps, their accountants must mark
136
down their portfolios to the assets' discounted value.
For federal income tax purposes, the sale of a loan for its discounted dollar value
will produce a loss to the bank. To the equity investor there will be a gain on the
exchange of the debt for local currency to the extent that the currency's fair market
dollar value exceeds the amount paid the bank. The basis in the foreign stock acquired
with the local currency will be calculated as the amount paid to the bank plus any gain
recognized on the exchange of debt for local currency. 137 If the bank itself engages
in a swap involving a credit to an American charity for its foreign activities (such as
park conservation for example), the fair market value of the local currency given to
38
the charity will be treated as a charitable contribution. 1
While such swaps have achieved some limited succesg, they have not significantly reduced the overall debt burden of developing countries. 39 Despite swaps and
write-downs of loans, major commercial banks remain at risk from foreign debt
exposure. 140
136. Buchheit, supra note 117, at 411.
137. See Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
138. See Rev. Rul. 87-124 and T.D. 8192, 53 Fed. Reg. 12.006.
139. Forexample, Chile, the most successful at debt-equity swaps, has succeeded in cancelling S2.5 billion, or 10%
of its total foreign debt. Truell, Chile PushesDebt-ConversionProgram,wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, at 34, col. 1. Mexico,
on the other hand, had only succeeded in cancelling $2 billion of its $108 billion foreign debt by the end of 1987. Riding,
Deepening Gloom Over Latin American Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1987, at D8, col. 4. See also Mexico, supra note*
128 at 461 (discussing limited success of debt-equity swaps in Latin America).
140. One source reports the following risk of major New York banks:
Money-Center Banks Most at Risk from Notice 89-58
Foreign Tax
Provision as a %
Average Foreign
of Total Income
Loans as a % of
Tax Provision
Total Average Loans
Company Name
57%
64
48
43
31
63

42%
40
35
31
37
58

Bankers Trust
Chase Manhattan
Citicorp
Continental Bank Corp.
Manufacturers Hanover
J.P. Morgan

Pugilski, IRS NoticeAlters Loan-LossAllocation, BANK ADIN., July 1989, at 10 (discussing the "sourcing" (between
domestic and foreign income) of loan losses according to Rev. Notice 89-58).
A more recent estimate gives the following figures:
Degrees of exposure

Citicorp
BankAmerica
Manufacturers
Hanover
Chase Manhattan
Chemical Banking
Bankers Trust
J.P. Morgan
Bartlett, supra note 1.

Medium- and
long-term third
world loans
(in millions)
$8,854
7,400
6,800
6,400
4,600
3,110
2,800

Reserve against
third world loans
(in millions)
$2,600
2,460
2,400
3,000
1,246
995
3,000

Reserve as
percentage
of loans
30%
33
36
46
27
32
100
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IL. PROBLEMATIC DEPOSITS: BANKS AS TRANSNATIONAL BORROWERS

A. CapitalFlight, Anonymity, and Taxes
Capital flight and the debt crisis are part and parcel of the same sad saga. The
economic difficulties of debtor nations that have borrowed in harder foreign currencies must be understood in the context of the capital flight that plagues developing
countries. The repayment of cross-border loans is problematic in large measure
because so much of the money lent to lesser developed countries flows out again to
be deposited in Western banks, often in so-called "haven" countries. One commentator has summarized the linkage this way:
In some cases, the wealthiest classes of poor countries have actually sent more money out
of their countries than foreign borrowing has brought in-and often it's the same money.
American banks have promoted, and profited from, both sides of the transaction. Sometimes
the money never leaves the United States. The entire cycle is completed with a few book4
keeping entries in New York.' '
According to one estimate, the foreign assets of nonbank private residents of the
fifteen biggest debtor countries amount to more than half their total foreign debt, or
over $300 billion. 142 It has been estimated that Mexico sent out half of the nearly
$100 billion borrowed between 1974 and 1985, with Argentina sending out 60% and
Venezuela 100%.143 The problem is not so much that developing countries do not
have assets, but that their assets are largely in foreign banks.
Corruption among politicians and bureaucrats of developing countries does not
help matters. 44 The deposed Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos reportedly
amassed a personal fortune estimated at $ 1.5 billion on an annual salary of less than
$50,000.145 Ex-President Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti was suspected of similarly
looting his country. 146 Both affairs raised sovereign immunity issues similar to those
discussed in the first part of this paper.
There is little consensus concerning the definition of capital flight. We refer to
"foreign investment" by Americans, Japanese and Kuwaitis, but to the "capital

141. Henry, supra note 2, at 20.
142. Brady's FadingPlan, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 1989, at 16 (quoting estimates by economists at J.P. Morgan).
For an empirical statistical country by country breakdown of external debt, capital flight and balance of payments for
some of the major debtor nations, see CAPiTAL FuGrr ANDTHiRn WoRLD DEBT 37-42 (D. Lessard & J. Williamson eds.
1987) [hereinafter CAPrnAL FLiGHT].
See also I. VALTER, supra note 2, at 42-43.
143. Henry, supra note 2, at 20.
144. See Reisman, HarnessingInternationalLaw to RestrainandRecaptureIndigenous Spoliations, 83 Am.J.INT'L
L. 56 (1988).
145. See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir. 1987). The complaint in the case
alleges conversion of $1.55 billion belonging to the Filipino government and its citizens, most of which allegedly went
into Swiss bank accounts. Allegedly $4 million went into real estate in Beverly Hills and $7 million went into property
located in Hawaii. Note, MarcosMania: The Crusadeto Return Marcos BillionsTo The PhilippinesThrough the Federal
Courts, 18 RuroG s L.J. 217 (1986). On the Marcos litigation, see Note, FerdinandMarcosand theAct ofState Doctrine,
13 J. lrr'L L. & TREATY 127 (1988). Note, Ex-Head of State Immunity: A ProposedStatutory Tool of ForeignPolicy, 97
YALE L.J. 299 (1987).
146. See Judgment of Apr. 25, 1989, Cour d'Appel Aix-en-Provence, France (No. 34311988) (quoting Haiti and its
fallen dictator Duvalier).
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flight" of Latin Americans and Africans. 147 The "flight" component dominates our
perception of the phenomenon that money runs away from the high inflation, heavy
taxation, and political instability of developing countries, toward the lower inflation,
greater political stability, and in some cases lower taxation, of hard-currency denominated assets in industrialized haven countries.
That developing country assets end up in the industrialized nations reflects a
desire for a greater security and reduced erosion of assets. The political and economic
risks of expropriation and hyper-inflation in Europe in the 1930's and in many of the
developing countries after the Second World War has served as a caution to many not
blessed with the relative stability known in the United States. The instability of much
of the world makes "anonymity" imperative for many. Thus a Swiss or Luxembourg
48
bank account may serve as a modern-day "city of refuge."'
The problem is not just with the economies and politics of the source countries,
however. Legal and fiscal policies of haven countries also play a role. In particular,
bank secrecy laws and favorable tax regimes are instrumental to the attraction of
foreign deposits by developed-country banks.
To understand the demand for secrecy in international banking, one must remember that the priorities of developing country depositors include the avoidance of
exchange controls and punitive tax policies in the country of their residence. The risk
of getting caught in the illegal export of capital is outside the experience of most
Americans. Confidentiality in the destination country tends to reduce this risk and
thus to increase the deposit's attractiveness. Some economists even claim that "it is
possible to map out the trade-offs between confidentiality, risk and expected returns
49
using a standard analytical framework." 1'
The United States has implicitly accepted this concern for confidentiality by
tailoring its tax regulations to permit foreigners to invest in American assets through
the screen of a financial institution in a banking secrecy haven. 150 Indeed, one abiding
conflict within United States national policy remains the need to preserve anonymity
as an option for foreign investors while preventing its use to facilitate violations of
American tax and insider trading law, or the laundering of illicit drug money.
Investors from abroad can often take advantage of tax regimes designed to attract
foreign capital. '51 For example, the United States has eliminated income taxation of
bank account interest paid to nonresident aliens, 152 bond interest paid to nonresident
aliens,1 53 and capital gains on securities. 154 Switzerland's "fiduciary deposit" (dip6t
147. See generally CAPITAL FUGHT, supra note 142.
148. See Numbers 35:11-12;Joshua20:2. The analogy to the Biblical "city of refuge" is admittedly strained, since
the Biblical refuge was intended to deal with reprisals against involuntary manslaughter. See M. ELO,4, PtUNclLES or
JEaIsH LAw 531 (1975).
149. Walter, supra note 2, at 103, 105.
150. See, e.g., Treas. Regs. 35a9999-5 (1989). See generally,Park, American Income Tax Aspects of Trans-Border
Securities Investments, supra note 9.
151. I.R.C. § 871(i) (1988). See generally McLure, U.S. Tax Laws and Captal Flightfrom Latin America, 20
INTER-AM. L. REv. 321 (1989).
152. I.R.C. § 871(h) (1988).
153. I.R.C. § 871(h) (1988) (re "portfolio debt" instruments).
154. See the "safe harbor" rules of I.R.C. § 864(b)(2) (1988).
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fiduciaire)accomplishes the same end of not taxing foreigners on interest from Swiss
bank accounts. 155
B. Bank Secrecy

156

The anonymity offered by bank secrecy has benefited a varied class of depositors: victims of Nazi persecution seeking refuge for their assets, the garden-variety
French and Italian businessmen looking for relief from their tax inspectors, and less
57
savory characters such as money launderers and corrupt dictators.
Bank secrecy does not always marry well with the interests of the allies and
trading partners of the haven country. Thus measures to breach foreign bank confidentiality are the logical extension of the American interest in enforcing economic
regulations designed to insure the integrity of its securities market and tax system.
The interests of our foreign friends, however, are no less important. Efforts to
sidestep confidentiality in the context of American judicial and administrative investigations have been problematic for financial centers where private banking represents
an important part of the national economy and work force. Switzerland in particular
has a bank secrecy law that is perceived by some bankers, both inside and outside of
Switzerland, as vital to the prosperity of Swiss financial institutions.
Switzerland's importance in international finance cannot be attributed exclusively to its secrecy laws. However, it would be disingenuous to claim that secrecy
is not a factor. One advantage of Switzerland over its chief European rival in private
banking is that the advancing integration of the European Economic Community
creates the risk that Luxembourg will be forced to compromise its banking secrecy' 58
by sharing information with other EEC members.
Essentially, Swiss bank secrecy covers the identity of the customers and the
details of their relationships. It is subject to a number of exceptions, the most
important of which is that it may be lifted in the context of judicial investigations,
including non-Swiss proceedings. Although banking secrecy' 59 is also required in-

155. The theory here is that a Swiss bank acts as a customer's agent in placing his money with a foreign bank in
a tax haven from which interest can be paid free of tax, the banking relationship existing directly between the foreign
customer and the foreign bank.
156. For a most extensive discussion of the interaction of bank secrecy and capital flight, see I. VALTER,
supra note
2. See also White, Principlesof Confidenhiality in Cross-BorderBanking, in LEGAL
ISSUES INCRoss-BoRDs BANKING
9-22
(R. Cranston ed. 1989).
157. See id. See also Nadelman, UnlaunderingDirty Money Abroad, 18 ITERs-Aa. L. R~v. 33 (1986).
158. The Luxembourg Penal Code states:
Physicians, surgeons, health officers, pharmacists, mid-wives and all other persons to whom, by reason of their
position or profession, secrets have been confided, and who reveal such secrets in cases other than those in
which they are called to testify in court and in those in which the law compels their disclosure, shall be
punishable by imprisonment from eight days to six months and a fine from 100 to 500 francs.
PENAL
COD art. 458 (Luxembourg). For cases in which the banking secrecy of Luxembourg was used to cover criminal
activity, see Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, S. Rep. No. 130, 99th Congress, 1st Sess.
94-95 (1985).
159. See M. AuBERT, J.-P. ICERNEN
& H. SCHiNiE, LE SECREr BANCAIRE
sUIssE (1982). See also Aubert, The Limits
of Swiss Banking Secrecy, J. IN'L TAX & Bus. LAw. (Boalt) 273 (1984); Dunant & Wassmer, Swiss Bank Secrecy: Its
Limits Under Swiss and InternationalLaws, 20 CASE W. REs. J. INr'L L. 541 (1988).
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directly by the Code of Obligations, 60 it is the Federal Banking Law of 1934 that
imposes the most explicit criminal penalties for the breach of bank secrecy.
Article 47 of the Federal Banking Law translates as follows:
1)Any person who in his capacity as a member of the governing body, employee, [or] agent
of a bank, reveals a secret confided to him or which he knew by reason of his position
or employment, or any person who induces another to violate professional secrecy shall be
imprisoned for not longer than six months or shall be fined not more than fifty thousand francs.
2) If the offender acted negligently, the penalty is a fine of not more than thirty thousand
francs.
3) Breach of secrecy remains punishable even after the holder of the secret has ended his
employment or mission, or has stopped his professional activity.
4) The provisions of federal and cantonal legislation concerning the duty to give information
6
to authorities and to testify in litigation are not affected.1 '
...

Article 273 of the Criminal Code has a similar effect by prohibiting the disclosure
of manufacturing or business secrets to foreign officials. 162 Apart from the penalties
provided in the Federal Banking Law and the Criminal Code, the banker and the bank
are civilly liable for a breach of secrecy and the bank risks the loss of its license.
Swiss banking secrecy is not absolute. In some cantons, a Swiss banker may be
obliged to testify in Swiss civil proceedings without regard to confidentiality. Bankers are obliged to testify in Swiss criminal cases, on the theory that public law and
the public interest preempt the private interest in bank secrecy.
Swiss bank secrecy is problematic in the context of international banking supervision. To consolidate the total risks of the banking group as a whole, regulatory
authorities in the country of the parent bank need to know whether borrowers from
foreign subsidiaries are also borrowers from the parent bank. There is some authority
160. Swiss law requires the "faithful and careful performance" (author's translation) of the banker's mandate,
including the obligation of confidentiality. CODE DESOBLIGArnONS [Co.I § 398 (Switz.).
161. Author's translation. The French original of Article 47 reads as follows:
I. Celui qui, en sa qualit6 de membre d'un organe, d'employ6, de mandataire, de liquidateur ou de commissaire
de la banque, d'observateur de ]a Commission des banques, ou encore de membre d'un organe ou d'employ6
d'une institution de revision agrd6, aura r~vdl6 un secret A lui confi6 ou dont il avait eu connaissance Araison
de sa charge ou de son emploi,
celui qui aura incitd autrui a violer le secret professionnel, sera puni de 'emprisonnement pour six mois au plus
ou de l'amende jusqu'A concurrence de 50 000 francs.
2. Si le drliquant a agi par ndgligence, la peine sera l'amende jusqu' concurrence de 30 000 francs.
3. La violation du secret demeure punissable alors m~me que la charge ou l'emploi a pris fin ou que le ddtenteur
du secret n'exere plus sa profession.
4. Sont rfservdes les dispositions de la 16gislation frddrale et cantonale statuant l'obligation de renseigner
l'autorit6 et de t6moigner en justice.
Loi f~dral sur les banques art. 47 (Switz).
162. Article 273:
Whoever makes available a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign governmental agency or a foreign
organization or private enterprise or to an agent of any of them, shall be subject to imprisonment and in grave
cases to imprisonment in a penitentiary. The imprisonment may be combined with a fine.
The French original reads:
Celui qui aura cherch6 Adrcouvrir un secret de fabrication ou d'affaires pour le rendre accessible Aun organisme
officiel ou priv6 4tranger, ou a une entreprise prive dtrang~re, ou Aleurs agents,
celui qui aura rendu accessible un secret de fabrication ou d'affaires a un organisme officiel ou privd 6tranger,
ou i une entreprise privde 4trangare, ou A leurs agents,
sera puni de 'emprisonnement ou, dans les cas graves, de la rdclosion. Le juge pourm en outre prononcer
'amende.
CODE PENAL
[Ce] art. 273 (Switz.).
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that Swiss supervisors have accepted the legitimacy of subsidiary disclosure of selected information to the parent when absolutely necessary for the supervision of
63
consolidated loans to one debtor.1
Despite their deserved reputation for protecting financial privacy, the Swiss
recently have become more open to requests to lift secrecy in the context of international judicial assistance.164 They are parties to a European Convention on Judicial
Assistance 65 and the United States-Swiss Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters.' 66 The latter Treaty gives American authorities the opportunity for access to
information otherwise covered by banking secrecy. 167 In the first six years of its
operation, the United States reportedly availed itself of the treaty over two hundred
68
times while the Swiss made sixty-five requests. 1

163. See letter from the Federal Banking Commission to the Association of Foreign Banks in Switzerland dated
December 3, 1984. The letter assumes that the customer will have agreed to disclosure.
German original:
Informationen fiber einzelne Kunden sollen zudem einzig dann erteilt werden, wenn aufsiehtsrechtlich zwingende Griinde vorliegen und im Ausland die ausschliessliehe Verwendung fur Zwecke der Bankenaufsicht
gewshrleistet ist. Im Vordergrund steht hier das Aktivgeschfft, insbesondere die Meldung von grrsseren
Schuldnern im Hinblick auf die konsolidierte Uberwachung von Klumpenrisiken, wfhrend in der Regel kein
aufsichtsrechtliches Bedirffnis an Angaben fiber einzelne Gllubiger oder Kunden des indifferenten Geschfts der
Tochterbank besteht.
French version:
Les rensiegnements concemant des clients ne pourront, en outre, etre fournis qu'ensuite de raisons impdratives
ayant trait a lasurveillance d'une part et, d'autre part, que si 'assurance est donne par l'dtranger de n'utiliser
les renseignements qu'A des fins de surveillance bancaire exclusivement. Dans cc contexte, I'accent est mis sur
les op6rations actives et, plus particuli~rement sur l'annonce de d6biteurs importants eu dgard Alasurveillance
consolidle des gros risques; dans un contexte plus glnlral, nul besoin de serveillance consolidde des gros
risques; dans un contexte plus gdndral nul besoin de surveillance de donnles s'impose quant aux crdanciers ou
clients particuliers en matidre d'op6rations indiff~rentes de lafiliale.
English translation:
Information concerning individual clients is therefore to be divulged only if imperative reasons relating to the
right of supervision make this necessary and provided a guarantee is given from abroad that the information
provided will be used exclusively for the purpose of banking supervision. In this connection, emphasis is placed
on lending and investment business and, in particular, on the reporting of relatively big borrowers with a view
to the consolidated supervision of aggregated risks; as a rule, no need related to the right of supervision exists
in respect of information concerning the non-credit business with creditors or clients of the subsidiary bank.
Id.
164. Crime andSecrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, S. Rep. No. 130, 99th Congress, IstSess.
49 (1985).
165. European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, opened for signiture, Apr. 20, 1959, 472
U.N.T.S. 185.
166. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27
U.S.T.S. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter Mutual Assistance Treaty].
167. The treaty provides:
The Swiss Central Authority shall, to the extent that a right to refuse to give testimony or produce evidence is
not established, provide evidence or information which would disclose facts which a bank is required to keep
secret or are manufacturing or business secrets, and which affect a person who, according to the request, appears
not to be connected in any way with the offense which is the basis of the request, only under the following
conditions:
a. the request concerns the investigation or prosecution of a serious offense;
b. the disclosure is of importance for obtaining or proving facts which are of substantial significance for
the investigation or proceeding; and
c. reasonable but unsuccesful efforts have been made in the United States to obtain the evidence or
information in other ways.
Id., art. 10§2.
168. Knapp, Mutual LegalAssistance Treatiesas a Way To PierceBank Secrecy, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 405,
414 (1988).
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1. Insider Trading
Investigation of "insider trading" in the American securities markets represents
one of the most fertile grounds for judicial assistance. 169 However, the Swiss-American Mutual Judicial Assistance Treaty did not initially cover insider trading offenses.
Generally, the Treaty requires "double criminality": the offense being investigated
must be a crime in both countries, or be listed on a schedule of offenses for which
"compulsory measures," including the lifting of bank secrecy, are available. 170 But
until 1988 Swiss law did not treat insider trading as a crime.
This defect in the Treaty was highlighted when the Americans requested assistance with respect to insider trading during the takeover of Santa Fe International by
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.' 7 ' The Swiss Supreme Court held that the double
criminality requirement was not satisfied and blocked the request. 172 In such circumstances, the only way to activate compulsory measures under the Treaty was to find
another offense that was violated by the inside trading-for example, employee
73
disloyalty in providing inside information to a tippee. 1
This anomaly was remedied in 1982 with the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding between the United States and Switzerland, 74 supplemented by an
agreement between Swiss banks and the Swiss Bankers' Association allowing for the
disclosure of information in insider trading cases.' 75 Since that time, cooperation
between American and Swiss authorities has been such that some Swiss attorneys
complain that Switzerland has gone "too far in its willingness to please foreign
countries."'176 In 1988, an amendment to the Swiss Criminal Code became effective
to prohibit insider trading explicitly, 77 thereby satisfying the double criminality

169. See generallyP. NEYROUD,MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
IN INSIDER DEAUNG (Int'l Bar Ass'n Strasbourg 1989); Hawes,

Lee & Robert, Insider Trading Law Developments: An InternationalAnalysis, 14 L. & POL'Y INr'L Bus. 335 (1982).
170. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 166, art. 4, attached schedule; Judgment of Jan. 26, 1983, Tribunal
f6ddral, Switz., 109 A.T.F. lb 47 [hereinafter Santa Fe 1].
171. Santa Fe I.
172. The request was later modified to describe the offenses under investigation as analogous to Code P.nal art. 162
(Switz.). On Santa Fe 11, see Operationsd'initids: Entraidejudiciairepour les Etats-Unis,Journal de Gen~ve, May 17,
1984, at 7, col. 4; Wall St. J. Europe, Aug. 19, 1983, at 2, col. 3. The Santa Fe case is reprinted in 28 CENTRE D'ETuODES
JURIDIQuE EUROPEfENNES,
FACULT~fDE DROIT DE GENdVE, COLLOQUE
INTERNATIONAL:
L'AVANr PROJECT
DE LOIFEDfRALE SUR
LES OPERATIONS
D'mmnffs 300 (1984).

173. See CODE IdNAL [CP] art. 162 (Switz.):
Celui quiaura rdv6ld un secret de fabrication ou un secret commercial qu'il dtait
tenu de garder en vertu d'une
obligation Idgale ou contractuelle, celui qui aura mis A profit cette rdvdlation, sera, sur plainte, puni de
l'emprisonnement ou de l'amende.
Id.
174. Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving International Law
Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland, reprintedin 22 Itr'L
LEGAL MArERIALS 1 (1983). See generally P. HONEGGER, AsmIFrANisctnE OFFENLEGuNGsPFLICsrEN IN KoNFLKT ,,trr
scunwstzEuscHEN GEHEuMstALTUNGStFLICT'EN
(1986). See also Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and
Illumination of the United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Comt.REG. 1 (1984).
175. Swiss Bankers' Association Agreement with Regard to the Handling of Requests for Information from the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) on the Subject of Misuse of Insider Information of Aug. 31, 1982, reprintedin
22 INr'L L. MAmIALS 7 (1983).
176. Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 159, at 575. The authors quote the Swiss Justice Minister who reported that
the Swiss acquiesced to all American requests in 1987. Id. Of course, this is probably because the Americans screen out
unjustifiable requests before they leave the Justice Department.
177. CP art. 161 (Switz.) entered into force July 1, 1988. The author's translation of the French version follows:
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requirement of the Mutual Assistance Treaty 78 and rendering both the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding and the Swiss Bankers' Association Agreement superfluous.
2. Tax Evasion'7 9
Tax evasion is another offense frequently facilitated by bank secrecy. The Mutual Judicial Assistance Treaty, however, is generally inapplicable to tax offenses,
except in the context of investigations or prosecutions of Mafia figures. 1 80 The
investigation must aim at persons reasonably suspected of belonging to the upper
echelon of organized crime.' 8'
The Swiss have also have implemented an internal (i.e., nontreaty-related)
statute on judicial assistance.t8 2 Characterization of the offense being investigated is
critical to the use of this statute. Like the Treaty, the law excludes from its scope
requests relating to tax offenses 8 3 except for a narrow category of complex tax fraud:
escroquerie (or in German Betrug). Escroquerieresults from what the law terms a
"clever posture"-attitude astucieuse. The intentional falsification of supporting
documents filed with a return (a balance sheet containing the erasure of a zero at the
end, for example) would constitute an attitude astucieuse, while a mere failure to file
would not.
The concept of "cleverness" or astuce in itself is of little help to the dialogue.
Astucieux translates as "artful" or "cunning" or "tricky" or "clever'--yet there is
Exploitation of confidential knowledge
1. A member of the board of directors, the management or the auditors or an agent of a stock company or
of a company controlling or being controlled by a stock company, a member of a governmental body or
a public official, an assistant of the aforementioned persons, who procures a pecuniary benefit for himself
or for another by exploiting or conveying to another his knowledge of confidential information which, if
and when publicized, can be expected to materially influence the price of shares, of other securities or of
options traded on a Swiss stock exchange, is subject to imprisonment or fine.
2. The recipient of information obtained from an insider as defined under paragraph I above who procures
a pecuniary benefit for himself or for another by exploiting this information is subject to imprisonment of
up to one year or to a fine.
3. Confidential information within the meaning of paragraphs I and 2 above includes an impending issue
of rights of participation, a merger or a similar event of comparable significance.
4. In case of a merger of two stock companies, paragraphs 1 to 3 apply to both companies.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 apply accordingly in the event that the exploitation of confidential information
relates to participation certificates, other securities, debentures or options of a cooperative society or a
foreign corporation.
Author's translation of Cr art. 161 (Switz.).
178. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 166. See Lombardini, Swiss Stock Exchanges: What Does the Future
Hold?, 8 Irr'L FtN. L. REv. 33 (1989).
179. See generally, Brown, Allowing Tax Laws to Cross Borders to Defeat InternationalTax Avoidance: The
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 15 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 59 (1989); Connick & Roth,
Subpoenas of Overseas Bank Records: Getting Out of the Middle-A Message to Bank Counsel, 9 N.Y. L. ScH. J. INT'L
& Co.mIp. L. 131 (1988); Frei, Overcoming Bank Secrecy:Assistance in Tax Matters in Switzerland on Behalf of Foreign
Criminal Authorities, 9 N.Y. L. ScH. J. Ir'tL & Comp. L. 107 (1988); Granwell & Desirgh, InternationalFiscal
Cooperation in Exchanges of Information: The United States Perspective, 4 STRA-EOY iN INr'l TAX'Nr173 (1989).
180. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 166, art. 2(1)(c)(5) and arts. 6 & 7.
181. Id. art. 2(2)(a) &art. 6. Other conditions forjudicial assistance in tax matters involving organized crime figures
include: (I) the evidence of crimes committed is insufficient to constitute proof of the crime, (a requirement intended to
prevent unnecessary requests for tax information), (2) the organized crime figure could be put in jail for a period of time
long enough to inflict serious harm on the group, and (3) the securing of the information or evidence would be impossible,
or unduly burdensome, without the assistance of the other state. Id. arts. 7(2) & (3).
182. Loi Sur L'Entraide Internationale En Matirre Pnale, 20 March 1981, entry Into force, 1 Jan. 1983.
183. Id. art. 3.
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obviously a requirement of something more than cleverness in an American sense.
The idea seems to be that a fraud is not astucieuse if the person defrauded could have
avoided being defrauded by reasonable care. The document changed must have some
juridical value other than as an information return in the case at hand. For example,
a balance sheet, or the employer's statement of the employee's salary, has such a
juridical value. The forgery of an employer's signature would be an escroquerie, as
would a fake invoice for services or goods.
The closest American tax law analogue of escroquerie may be the willful making of a false statement under penalty of perjury. 184 On the other hand, a "willful
failure to file a return or supply information" would probably not constitute escroquerie. There must be a forged or "doctored" document, or intentionally falsified
accounts to constitute escroquerie.
Article XVI of the Income Tax Treaty provides' 85 for an exchange of information between the tax administrations of the two countries. However, the treaty expressly excludes from its coverage the exchange of any information that would
disclose "any trade, business, industrial or professional secret." 186 This covers bank
secrecy and the attorney-client privilege. Thus, if the information is unobtainable
under local law, it will probably not be obtainable under the Treaty. The only
exception to the protection of secrecy seems to be the case where fraud is committed
by a U.S. citizen or resident against the Internal Revenue Service. Language in the
treaty permits exchange of information "as is necessary . . . for the prevention of
fraud" in relation to taxes covered by the treaty. 187 This would seem to cover the case
of American tax cheats. It is not certain (at least to this author) what sort of "fraud"
(complex escroquerie or simple American-style fraud) is covered.
3. Convention de Diligence
In at least one way, Swiss efforts to prevent bank secrecy from being used to
facilitate serious crimes are more far-reaching than American measures. Members of
the Swiss Bankers' Association agreed to what is commonly called the "Convention
de Diligence" (CDB) translated as "Agreement on the Swiss Banks' Code of Conduct
with regard to the Exercise of Due Diligence."' 188 The heart of the Convention de
Diligence is the "know your customer" rule. To preserve the reputation of the Swiss
banking community and to ensure ethical conduct when accepting funds, the banks
agree:
a) to verify the identity of their contracting partners and, in cases of doubt, to obtain from
the contracting partner a declaration setting forth the identity of the beneficial owner to
whom the assets entrusted to the bank belong;
b) not to provide any active assistance in the flight of capital;
184. Punishable under I.R.C. § 7206 (1988).
185. United States-Switzerland Income Tax Treaty, May 24, 1951, art.
26, 2 U.S.T.S. 1751, 1760 T.I.A.S. No.
2316.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Copies of the Agreement with the most recent amendments dating from July 1, 1987, are available in
translation from the Swiss Bankers' Association. The Agreement is called hereinafter "Convention de Diligence."
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c) not to provide any active assistance in cases of tax evasion or similar acts, by delivering
incomplete or misleading attestations. 5 9
Banks are generally required to verify the ultimate beneficial owner of accounts
held by shell companies (socijtsde domicile). A socigtg de domicile is defined to
include Swiss and foreign enterprises regardless of their function or registered office,
provided
a) they do not have their own premises (i.e., they are domiciled c/o an attorney, a trust
company, a bank, etc.), or b) they do not have their own staff working exclusively for them,
or their own staff engages solely in administrative tasks (bookkeeping and correspondence
under instructions issued by individuals or companies controlling the domiciliary
company). ,90
By knowing its customers, the Swiss banking community will be able to distinguish
the use of secrecy to protect two different types of criminal activity: (1) acts condemned by most of the world community-drug running, money laundering, and
illegal arms dealing; and (2) what might be termed normal capital flight: the Italian
businessman not paying his full share of taxes, or the traumatized immigrant trying
to prepare a financial "city of refuge"''9 if things go as bad in his new home in Latin
America as they did in his old home in Europe or the Middle East.
In some cases accounts are opened not by the customer, but by a lawyer or
accountant bound by professional confidentiality acting on behalf of a client. The
Convention de Diligence requires that such lawyers and fiduciaries confirm to the
bank that they know the identity of the beneficial owner of the account. For example,
the lawyer and accountant must know that "No-Tell Fabric Company S.A. of Panama" is ultimately owned by Mrs. Christine Park of Quakertown. Having displayed
due diligence, they must further confirm that they are not aware of any fact that might
indicate that the customer is abusing the right to banking secrecy, or that the assets
concerned are the fruit of any criminal activity. 192 The professional relationship may
not be transitory, nor "aimed primarily at concealing the name of the beneficial
93
owner from the bank." 1
The Convention de Diligence also provides that Swiss banks may not provide
any "active assistance" in transferring capital outside countries whose laws impose
restrictions on the placing of funds abroad. 194 The customer must supply his own
suitcase to carry the money across the border.
189. Id. art. 1.
190. See Convention de Diligence, supra note 188. This report is made on "Form A."
191. See supra note 148.
192. Convention de Diligence, supra note 188, art. 5, § 2.
193. Id.
194. Id. art. 6. In the annotation to art. 6, the Swiss Bankers Association defines "active assistance" as follows:
a) receiving clients abroad by appointment outside the bank's own premises, for the purpose of accepting funds;
b) participation abroad in the setting up of offset transactions when the bank knows or, based on a combination
of circumstances, should know that the offset is aimed at furthering the flight of capital;
c) active collaboration with individuals and companies that arrange for the flight of capital on behalf of third
parties or who provide assistance to this effect
- by remitting orders;

- by promising them commissions;
- by keeping their accounts while such individuals or companies have their domicile or registered office
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The Swiss desire to present a good image is further evidenced by Swiss government measures in the Marcos affair. The Federal Council blocked the Marcos'
assets in six major banks, and all Swiss banks were advised that it would be a
violation of their duty of diligence to allow the withdrawal of Marcos' funds before
the situation was clarified. 1 95 The initial blocking order was replaced by a provisional
order when the Philippines made a request for legal assistance. The political expediency in the blocking of the Marcos' assets has attracted notice, not always
t 96
favorable.
It should be noted that when the shoe is on the other foot, and foreign investigations lead to records of American banks, the United States has been liberal in
granting foreign governmental authorities access to documents of financial institutions in the United States. 97 American courts will assist foreign judges through
letters rogatory under domestic statute' 98 as well as under treaty.' 99
C. The ExtraterritorialReach of Orders Compelling Information
When mutual judicial assistance is not effective, American courts have attempted to obtain disclosure of information unilaterally, generating considerable
controversy concerning the "extraterritorial" effect of American law. One commentator has articulated the dilemma as follows:
[C]ourts committed to the rule of law must order acts in violation of foreign law, or thwart
enforcement of domestic law, effectively surrendering sovereignty to the foreign nation.
Inordinate deference to foreign law would be an invitation to expanded nefarious use of
foreign banks, resulting in a hemorrhage of revenue, or a haven for the profits of illegal
activities which could either conceal criminal conduct or make the possibility of detection and
punishment worth the risk. Obdurate insensitivity to the laws of foreign sovereigns, and the
dificult situation in which the bankers in the middle find themselves, would give rise to
in Switzerland and the bank knows that they are using their accounts for business purposes to assist in the
flight of capital;
d) referring customers to the persons and companies described in letter e).
e) Visits to customers abroad are authorized provided the officer acting on behalf of the bank does not accept
any funds that may not be legally transferred, gives no advice to assist in the illegal transfer of capital, and does
not participate in any offset transactions.
Id. art. 6.
195. The order of the Federal Council (the Cabinet) was signed in Bern on May 24, 1986, by Council President Egli.
It was based on art. 102-8 of the Swiss Constitution, giving the Federal Council authority to take measures to safeguard
relations with foreign countries.
196. Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 159, at 565. The two Swiss commentators have stated:
The attitude of the Federal Council and the Federal Banking Commission was clearly motivated by political
considerations to avoid or defeat the criticism periodically voiced against Swiss bank secrecy. It is extremely
difficult to foresee how the Swiss banks will be able to follow the rules set forth by the Federal Banking
Commission in the Marcos case, especially to block assets prior to the filing of any request for assistance by
a foreign State. It is therefore to be hoped that the Marcos case will remain unique.
Id.
197. For a recent case, see Young v. Department of Justice, 882 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1989) (involving a Bermuda
investigation and the United States Right to Financial Privacy Act).
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781, note 7 (Convention on Taking of Evidence
Abroad) (West Supp. 1989). See also Societe Nationale y. U.S. Dist. Court, S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company, 703 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Lincoln First Bank, [1980-1] U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) at 19231. See also United States v. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183
(1989).
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charges of arrogance and scorn for solemn pronouncements on the sanctity of the "rule of
law., 'Zo
An early Supreme Court decision on the production of documents held in secrecy havens was Societg Internationalepour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales S.A. v. Rogers20 1 better known as the "Interhandel" case, following the
Swiss company's German name. A Swiss company sued the U.S. Attorney General
for the return of assets seized from it during the Second World War pursuant to the
Trading With the Enemy Act. 202 Interhandel alleged that when the assets were seized
it was not an "enemy," in that its capital was not controlled by Germans. The United
States government moved 20 3 for an order requiring Interhandel to produce certain
documents concerning its ultimate beneficial owners, who might have invested
through the screen of Swiss banks holding the Interhandel shares as nominees for
Germans. The District Court had granted the government's motion to dismiss the
204
action because of noncompliance with the discovery order.
The Supreme Court held that Swiss secrecy law and the interdiction by the Swiss
authorities made dismissal an inappropriate sanction in the circumstances. "[F]ailure
to comply [with the request for documents] has been due to inability," the Court
concluded, "and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.' '205 The
Interhandel case is often cited for the proposition that a good faith effort to comply
with a request for documents will constitute a defense to an order for extraterritorial
discovery in violation of foreign secrecy laws.
Since the Interhandel case, more than one court decision has dealt with the
extraterritorial reach of federal court orders compelling production of documents in
secrecy jurisdictions. 20 6 One early decision applied a comity approach and refused to
order compliance with discovery orders or subpoenas that would force a party to violate
a foreign law. 20 7 With the adoption of the Restatement (Second) ofForeignRelations
Law in 1965, courts more frequently applied a balancing test. 208 The first significant
200. O'Donnell, The Secrets of Foreign Bankers and theFederalInvestigation: Tottering Balances, 20 CASE W.
RFs. J. INT'L L. 509, 513 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
201. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
202. 50 U.S.C. app. § 9(a) (1982). See Societe Internationale,357 U.S. at 198-99.
203. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
204. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 200.
205. Id. at 212.
206. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. ), cert. denied sub nom., Roe v. United States, 484 U.S. 963,
(1987); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (1Ith Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); United
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1986); United States v.
Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.), modified, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981);
United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
207. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
208. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF FoEstoN RELATONS LAW OF THEUNrrED STATES
§ 40 (1965). Section 40 states:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement JurisdictionWhere two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce
rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state
is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the
person,

(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
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decision to apply the balancing test was United States v. FirstNationalCity Bank,2o9
where the court held that the conflict between German banking secrecy and American
antitrust law was no excuse for failure to comply with a discovery order.
In a more recent decision, S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,210 the
Southern District of New York combined the Restatement's balancing test with the
good faith test of the Interhandel case. The S.E.C. requested discovery in connection
with an investigation of insider trading in the "St. Joe Minerals" affair. The court
granted an order to produce documents of the Swiss institution through which the
insider trading was allegedly done, finding that the bank had acted in bad faith. 21'
Judge Pollack wrote that the bank "made deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure law
to evade, in commercial transaction for profit to it, the strictures of American securities law against insider trading.''212 He continued:
Whether acting solely as an agent or also as a principal (something which can only be
clarified through disclosure of the requested information), BSI invaded American securities
markets and profited in some measure thereby. It cannot rely on Swiss nondisclosure lav to
shield this activity.213

In a well-publicized 1979 uranium antitrust case 2 14 Westinghouse sought to
compel documents from foreign uranium producers. The court settled on the strength
of the American interest as the only pertinent inquiry.21 5 The District Court evaluated
the problematic task of balancing contradictory and mutually negating interests in such
a case:
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to
evaluate the economic and social policies of a foreign country, such a balancing test is
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance
with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id.
209. 396 F.2d 897, 902-05 (2d Cir. 1968).
210. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
211. Id. at 119.
212. Id. at 117.
213. Id. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court in Societe Internationalehad considered the bad faith
test when it was deciding whether the sanction of dismissing Interhandel's action was appropriate. The court in Banca
Della Svizzera Italianaapplied the test to the question of whether the discovery order should be issued and decided the
sanction issue simultaneously.
In two Bank of Nova Scotia cases, the Eleventh Circuit also applied the bad faith test with the Restatement (Second)'s
balancing test in determining the appropriateness of the sanctions applied to the custodian bank-a fine of $25,000 a day
which eventually totaled $1,825,000. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 819, 821 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). This mode of analysis stacks the cards against the custodian of documents who is
bound by bank secrecy, for it invariably balances away the custodian's ostensible good faith efforts to reconcile conflicting legal rules by asserting the United States' superior interests in the enforcement of its laws. See Note, Court
Ordered Violations of Foreign Bank Secrecy and Blocking Laws: Solving the ExtraterritorialDilemma, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REv. 563, 591-93. For example, the court in the second Bank of Nova Scotia case said:
In a world where commercial transactions are international in scope, conflicts are inevitable. Courts and
legislatures should take every reasonable precaution to avoid placing individuals in the situation [the Bank] finds
[it]self. Yet, this court simply cannot acquiesce in the proposition that United States criminal investigations must
be thwarted whenever there is conflict with the interests of other states.
Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 828.
214. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. II1. 1979) (Marshall, J.).
215. Id.
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inherently unworkable in this case. The competing interests here display an irreconcilable
conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy. Westinghouse seeks to enforce this
nation's antitrust laws against an alleged international marketing arrangement among uranium producers, and to that end has sought documents located in foreign countries where
these producers conduct their business. In specific response to this and other related litigation in American courts, three foreign governments have enacted nondisclosure legislation
which is aimed at nullifying the impact of American antitrust legislation by prohibiting
access to those same documents. It is simply impossible to judicially "balance" these totally
216
contradictory and mutally negating actions.
In 1986, The American Law Institute adopted the Restatement (Third) ofForeign
Relations Law of the United States. The Restatement (Third) describes permissible
bases of a state's jurisdiction to prescribe, 21 7 but provides that the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe is not allowed where to do so would be "unreasonable. ' 21 8 The
Restatement (Third) requires deferral to a foreign state's clearly greater interests.

Section 403 provides:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable....
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over
a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state has an
obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction,
in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that
29
state's interest is clearly greater. 1
Moreover, the Restatement (Third) specifically deals with American requests for

216. Id.
217. RESTAmMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THEUNITED STArES § 402 (1986). Section 402 provides:
Subject to § 403 a state has jurisdiction toprescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of
the state or against a limited class of other state interests.
Id. § 402.
218. Id. § 403(2). Section 403(2) provides the following test of reasonableness:
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined by evaluating all
relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes
place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and
the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the
extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system;
(f)the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
219. Id. § 403.
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disclosure of information abroad. 220 Section 441 provides a foreign compulsion defense that contains a "territorial" preference 221 to the country where the witness or
documents are located: in general, a state may not require a person
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of
the state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by the law of that state or
by the law of the state of which he is a national. 222
Section 442(2) similarly provides respect for rival national interests in the explicit
context of orders to compel production of documents abroad that run afoul of foreign
"blocking statutes":
If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the state in which the information or
prospective witness is located, or of the state of which a prospective witness is a national,
(b) a court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions of contempt, dismissal, or
default on a party that has failed to comply with the order for production, except in
cases of deliberate concealment or removal of information or of failure to make a good
faith effort .... 223
Courts may, however, draw adverse inferences from failure to comply with
orders for the production of documents. 224 Thus "blocking statutes" designed to
thwart American investigators (such as Swiss Penal Code Article 273) are not necessarily given the same deference as substantive rules of foreign law. 2 25
D. Perceptionsof Privacy Rights
It is hard to deal with foreign secrecy laws without first examining one's own
cultural attitude to the emotionally charged term "secrecy," often an invidious term
for the privacy or anonymity or confidentiality that government agencies consider
220. Id. § 442 (entitled "Requests for Disclosure: Law of the United States"):
(1)
(a) A court or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of court, may order a
person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, objects, or other information relevant to an
action or investigation, even if the information or the person in possession of the information is outside
the United States.
(b) Failure to comply with an order to produce information may subject the person to whom the order
is directed to sanctions, including finding of contempt, dismissal of a claim or defense, or default
judgment, or may lead to a determination that the facts to which the order was addressed are as asserted
by the opposing party.
(c) In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of information located abroad, and in
framing such an order, a court or agency in the United States should take into account the importance
to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the state where the information is located.
Id.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 441 comment b.
§ 441(1).
§ 442(2).
§ 442(2)(c).
§ 442 reporter notes 4, 5 & 6.
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pathological. American perceptions of bank secrecy affect how American courts and
government agencies issue and enforce disclosure orders. Often, Americans see
secrecy as nothing more than an intrinsically improper way to facilitate tax fraud,
226
drug running, and money laundering.
The Swiss perception of bank secrecy contrasts sharply with the American view.
One distinguished Swiss lawyer has written that "bank secrecy remains a right that
is fundamental to respect for one's private life.' '227
The European viewpoint has much to recommend it if one considers the plight
of those who may face persecution in exotic countries. Swiss bank secrecy may be the
only hope for a refugee's economic renewal. The plight of German Jews in the 1930's
is particularly instructive in this regard. The Swiss bankers often devised ingenious
systems for distinguishing between German clients' voluntary instructions to pay
from those that were coerced.2 8 The difficult dispersion of many Sephardic Jews
from Arab lands provides a more modern-day illustration of the legitimate need for
secrecy laws.
The American perception of the secrecy inherent in the attorney-client privilege
differs from the American perception of bank secrecy. Privilege is one basis for
challenge of the I.R.S. administrative summons, and discovery requests do not
229
extend to privileged matters.
It may be significant that American attempts to breach foreign secrecy laws have
focused on foreign bankers rather than foreign lawyers. In part, this may be due to
the context in which the cases arise: insider trading is carried on through a foreign
nominee bank account, and the fruits of tax evasion are deposited in an overseas
financial institution.
However, the explanation might also include cultural factors. The attorneyclient privilege (even if it does not extend to the identity of the client 230 ) is so deeply
ingrained in the American psyche that tinkering with it can be expected to create
considerable institutional fuss from the legal profession. The type of society we desire
requires respect for attorney-client relationships. In contrast, an attack on the secrecy
of the bank industry involves a relationship that, in the United States, has never
known a similar privilege.
226. See S. REP. No. 130, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (entitled "Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks
SENATECOMMITTEE
ONGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
and Companies"); STAFF OF PtrtArEerSUBCOMMTTrrE ONINVESTIGATIONS,

197-214
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1983). See also R. GORDON, TAX HAVENS ANDTHEm USE BY U.S. TAXPAYERS
(1981).
227. Aubert, Quelques Aspects de laPortledu Secret Bancaireen drolt pinal interne et dans l'entraidejudiciaire
SUISSE 167 (noting that "lesecret bancaire demeure un droit fondamental du respect
internationale, 1984 REvuE PENALE
de ]a vie privde.").
INNUMBERS
82-87 (1982).
228. See N. FArm, SAFETY
229. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982); FED R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. CiuM.
P. 17(c); 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c)(1) (1988).
230. See McCoERtuc oN EVIDENCE § 90, at 215 (E. Cleary ed. 1984).
The traditional and still generally applicable rule denies the privilege for the fact of consultation or employment,
including the component facts of the identity of the client, such identifying facts about him as his address and
occupation, the identity of the lawyer, and the scope or object of the employment.
Id. § 90, at 215. Recently, federal grand juries have subpoenaed lawyers to provide names of clients who are known to
represent the upper echelons of organized crime, in an attempt by the Justice Department to discover the "kingpins"

behind racketeering.
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In Switzerland, the bankers' privilege is not completely analogous to that of
lawyers. Communications with persons listed in article 321 of the Swiss Penal
Code 23 t-including clergy, lawyers, and doctors, but not bankers-are subject to the
strictest and most absolute of professional secrecy. However, secrecy under article 47
of the Banking Law is specifically subject to what the Swiss call the "duty to...
present testimony.' '232 So bankers may be required to give testimony about customers
in judicial investigations of suspected criminal activity.
Perhaps one difference between lawyers and bankers is that attorneys, like
doctors and clergy, require a confidential relationship with the client interlocutor that
is less critical to the banker providing honest finanacial advice. This is obviously a
distinction about which reasonable people may differ, and which does not foreclose
speculation about the merit of viewing the banker's privilege as we do the attorneyclient privilege.
E. Economic Regulations and PoliticalGoals
American banks have developed a thriving business in Eurodollar accounts
(dollar-denominated deposits held in European branches and subsidiaries) of foreign
customers. Foreign depositors obviously do not want their accounts to be frozen
during political disputes between their home country and the United States. The
United States, however, has used Eurodollar freezes as a tool in the exercise of
foreign policy, 233 creating yet another conflict on the liability side of the bank's
balance sheet.
The tension between the security of deposits and the vicissitudes of American
politics was played out when, in 1979, the United States Treasury froze Iranian
assets,2 34 and again in 1986 when President Reagan ordered a freeze of all dollardenominated Libyan assets, including those held in foreign branches of American
banks. 235

231. Article 321 provides:
Les eccldsiastiques, avocats, d6fenseurs en justice, notaires, contr6leurs astreints au secret professionnel en
vertu du code des obligations, m~decins, dentistes, pharmaciens, sage-femmes, ainsi que leurs auxiliaires, qui
auront r6vdl6 un secret A eux confi6 en virtue de leur profession ou dont ils
avaient eu connaissance dans
I'exercice de celle-ci, seront, sur plainte, punis de l'emprisonnement ou de I'amende.
CP art. 321 (Switz.).
232. Article 47(4) of the Loi fdddral sur les banques reads:
Sont rkserves les dispositions de la16gislation f6ddrale
et cantonale statuant l'obligation de renseigner l'autoritd
et de tdmoigner en justice.

Id.
233. For the most comprehensive analysis of freeze orders and Eurodollar deposits, see Smedresman & Lowenfeld,
supra note 56. See also Rutzke, The Libyan Asset Freeze and ItsApplication to Foreign Government Depositsin Overseas
Branches of United States Banks: Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Banker's Trust Co., 3 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 241
n.l (1988) (discussing the President's powers to order asset freezes in wartime under the Trading With the Enemy Act
of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1982), and in peacetime under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
of 1977, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(l)(B) (1982)).
234. Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982) and the National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982) and the Presidential power of delegation, 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). See
Edwards, ExtraterritorialApplicationof the U.S. IranianAssets ControlRegulations,75 Am. J. INT'L L. 870, 871 (1981).
235. President Reagan acted under the International Emergency Powers Act in issuing Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3
C.F.R. 183 (1987), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. III 1985).
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The freeze of Iranian assets, ordered ten days after the taking of American
hostages in Iran236 forbade any payment to Iran23 7 by "persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" and defined that term to include foreign branches and
subsidiaries of American banks. 238 As subsequently amended, the regulations allowed payments to be made to Iran on deposits denominated in currencies other than
the dollar.3 9 As the hostage crisis dragged on, the regulations were further amended
to bar payments to private individuals in Iran. In total, the freeze is reported to have
240
affected over nine billion dollars of Iranian assets.
The IMF Articles permit member countries to obtain approval of currency
restrictions imposed for reasons of national security, 24' which approval the United
States obtained for both the original and the subsequent asset freeze. The Iranians
then filed suits against six American banks in London 242 and two in Paris 243 to obtain
payment on its deposits. No judgments were handed down in these suits because the
crisis was eventually resolved by the release of the hostages and the creation of a

236. The hostages were taken on Nov. 4, 1979. See generally Edwards, supra note 234, at 870-71.
237. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1980)). The regulation reads as follows:
(a) The term "'Iran" and "Iranian Entity" includes:
(1) The state and the Government of Iran as well as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof or any territory, dependency, colony, protectorate, mandate, dominion, possession or place subject
to the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization substantially owned or controlled by any
of the foregoing;
(3) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, or to the extent that there is reasonable cause
to believe that such person is,
or has been, since the effective date acting or purporting to act directly or
indirectly on behalf of any of the foregoing;
(4) Any territory which on or since the effective date is controlling or occupied by the military, naval or police
forces or other authority of Iran; and,
(5) Any other person or organization determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be included within
paragraph (a) hereof.
Id.
238. 31 C.F.R. § 535.329 (1980) stated:
The term "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" includes:
(a) Any person wheresoever located who is a citizen or resident of the United States;
(b) Any person actually within the United States;
(c) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state, territory, possession, or
district of the United States; and
(d) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization wheresoever organized or doing
business which is owned or controlled by persons specified in paragraph (b).
44 Fed. Reg. 65,956, 64,957 (1979) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 535.329 (1980)).
239. Section 535.566 of the regulations as amended Nov. 19, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,833 (1979) (codified
at 31 C.F.R. § 535.566 (1980)).
240. Iran is ReportedReady Fora Deal to RecoverAssets, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1989, at Al. The New York Times
recently reported that S1.8 billion was still frozen. See Clawson, Tell Teheran: No Hostages, No Money, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 4, 1989, at 27.
241. IME Articles, act. VIII § 2(a), supra note 76, as amended by Second Amendment to IMF Articles, art. VIII,
§ 2(a), supra note 76.
242. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, Bankers Trust Co., Chase Manhattan Bank N.A.,
Citibank N.A., Irving Trust Co., and Manufacturers HanoverTrust Co. The suits were begun against five of the six banks
on Nov. 30, 1979 in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court. The action against Bankers
Trust was commenced some time later. The cases were consolidated for purposes of trial. Edwards, supra note 234, at
876 n.32.
243. The Iranian bank's actions against the Paris branches of Citibank and Bank of America National Trust and
Savings Association were commenced in the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris. Id.
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Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to adjudicate the claims of U.S. nationals against
Iran. 244
The Paris and London litigations centered primarily on whether the American
banks would violate the freeze regulations by paying on the deposits. The American
banks argued that they routinely made transfers into and out of a clearing system in
New York to service their Eurodollar accounts (the Clearing House Interbank Payments System, or CHIPS), 245 which meant that to pay on the Iranian deposits they
would have to transfer funds in the United States in violation of the law of the country
of performance. The Iranians replied that the banks could make the payments required using funds available to them outside the United States. If performance could
be accomplished entirely outside the United States, French and British courts might
normally ignore the attempted extraterritorial reach of the regulations, unless they fell
246
under Article VIII(2)(b) of the IMF Articles.
The applicability of this IMF Article on exchange contracts turned on at least
three issues: (1) Were the American freeze regulations "exchange control regulations?"; (2) Were the deposits "exchange contracts" involving the currency of the
United States?; (3) Were the American freeze regulations "imposed consistently with
247
this IMF Agreement?"
At first blush, the United States Iranian Assets Control Regulations took the
form of "exchange control regulations" in that they controlled international payments or transfers of dollars. However, several respected scholars have argued that
under the IMF Articles, it is not the form of the regulations that matters, but their
purpose. The Iranian freeze regulations, of course, were not intended to protect the
soundness of the dollar and to control the balance of payments-the traditional
rationale for exchange controls-but rather to force the release of hostages. 248
As already mentioned, opinions diverge on the definition of "exchange
contracts." The American banks argued for the broad view that any contract that
requires an international payment or transfer of currency constitutes an "exchange
contract." The Iranians argued that no exchange of currencies was contemplated by
244. Id. Of the $9.97 billion frozen, the tribunal transferred $3.89 billion to Iran with the rest remaining in escrow
accounts or being paid to American companies or Iranian interests. Iran is ReportedReady For a Dealto Recover Assets,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1989, at Al, A6.
245. The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), located in New York, is the United States domestic
clearing system for international payments. It clears, on average, between $600 and $700 million a day, and has been
known to clear $1.25 trillion in one day. It has 140 international banks with offices in New York as members. Big-Buck
Transfersa Big Risk, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 14, 1989, at 1.
246. IMF Articles, art. VlII(2)(b), supra note 76, which provides:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control
regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in
the territories of any member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures for the
purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either member more effective, provided that such
measures and regulations are consistent with this Agreement.
Article VIII also provides, in Section 2(a) that
Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 2, no member shall, without the
approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international
transactions.
247. Edwards, supra note 234, at 883.
248. See id. at 884. See also Comment, The IranianAssets Control Regulations and the InternationalMonetary
Fund: Are the Regulations "Exchange Control Regulations?", 4 B.C. IrWL & Comp. L. REv. 203 (1981).

1989]

LEGAL POLICY CONFLICTS IN INT'L BANKING

1111

the contracts: they deposited Eurodollars and expected Eurodollars in return. A
similar doctrinal dispute exists concerning the meaning of an exchange contract that
involves the currency of the relevant IMF member. A broad definition includes any
contract that affects a country's exchange resources. The opposing position holds that
a contract involves the currency of a country only if that currency is named in the
contract as a currency of payment, or payment is in fact necessary to the performance
of the contract.
Finally, on the issue of whether the U.S. regulations were consistent with the
IMF Articles, most authorities have held that approval by the IMF under article VIII
should be conclusive as to consistency with the Articles. 249
The release of the American hostages and the creation of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal terminated the Paris and London cases. Scholars and practitioners
were thus denied-though only for a season-judicial determination of the nature of
deposit contracts and the necessity of performance of dollar transactions in the United
States.
It should come as no surprise that many of the issues raised with respect to the
Iranian freeze resurfaced six years later, when President Reagan ordered the freeze of
Libyan assets.250 The Executive Order blocked
all property and interests in property of the Government of Libya, its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Libya that are in the United States,
that hereafter come within the United States or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of U.S. persons including overseas branches of U.S. persons. 251
When the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) asked Bankers Trust for repayment of the funds held in LAFB's London account, 252 the Libyans expressed a
willingness to accept payment by any commercially recognized means, including in
sterling. 253 Bankers Trust claimed the President's order prevented it from complying.
The issue arose whether the operation of the Eurodollar account necessarily involved
the transfer of funds through CHIPS, thereby requiring Bankers Trust to commit an

249. See Edwards, supra note 234, at 895 n.107 (listing authorities). The director of the Legal Department of the
IMF has stated that currency restrictions approved by the IMF under IMF art. VIII, § 2(a) constitute "exchange control
regulations maintained consistently with the Fund's Articles." Id. at 900.
250. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 314 (Q.B. 1987), [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259
(Staughton, J.), reprintedin 26 INT'L L. MATERILS 1600 (1987); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust, 11988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 494, [19S91 I Lloyd's Rep. 608 (Q.B. 1989) (Hirst, J.).
251. Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3 C.F.R. 183 (1986), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. III 1985). This was the
second such order in as many days. The previous one blocked trade and other transactions with Libya. Exec. Order No.
12,543, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1986), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. III 1985). See also Attack Cement v. Roumanian
Bank for Foreign Trade, [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 572 (C.A.) which restated the rule that actions relating to a bank account
are governed by the law of the place where the account is kept.
252. The Libyans actually had two different accounts: a London account with a balance of about S131 million, and
a New York account. Part of the litigation concerned a sum of about S161 million that Bankers Trust was instructed by
the Libyans to transfer out of the New York account into the London account just hours before the President issued his
second blocking order. The dispute was essentially factual and does not interest us here. In effect, the British court held
that Bankers Trust was in breach when it refused to carry out the instructions received and was held liable for the sum.
Bankers Trust, [ 1989] 3 W.L.R. at 317-19. Of course, this interim holding did not decide the issue of whether Bankers
Trust could pay the transferred amount to the Libyans out of the London account.
253. Id. at 328.
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illegal act in the United States.25 4 The Libyans' banking relationship with Bankers
Trust was complicated. All operations on that account were conducted through New
York, where the Libyans maintained a 500,000 dollar, interest-free, minimum "peg"
balance. Any excess above the minimum balance was to be transferred daily to the
London account and any deficit was to be made up from that account. As a result, Mr.
Justice Staughton found that it was "a term of that arrangement that all the Libyan
5
bank's transactions should pass through New York.' '2
Mr. Justice Staughton assumed that it was a well-established principle of English
conflicts law that "[p]erformance of a contract is excused if (i) it has become illegal
by the proper law of the contract, or (ii) it necessarily involves doing an act which is
unlawful by the law of the place where the act is to be done. '256
As for the proper law of the contract, 25 7 the judge stated that the contract
between a bank and its customer is generally governed by the law of the place where
the account is kept, absent agreement to the contrary.25 8 Despite the fact that the
account was operated "through" New York, the account was kept in London because
the actual entries on it were made there. Because of the unique method of operating
the London account in tandem with the New York account, the court was prepared to
concede that some aspects of the two-headed contractual relationship were governed
by New York law, although the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to
the London account itself were governed by English law.2 5 9
The determination of the proper law was of great significance. When the Libyans were negotiating the terms of their relationship with Bankers Trust in 1980, the
Iranian assets freeze was very much on their minds. Staughton summarized their
concern as follows:
Political risk must commonly be an important factor to those who deposit large sums of
money with banks; the popularity of Swiss bank accounts with some people is due to the
banking laws of the Cantons of Switzerland. And I have already found, on the evidence of
Bankers Trust, that the Iranian crisis was at the back of everyone's mind in 1980.260
Thus he concluded, "Whatever considerations did or did not influence the parties to
this case, I believe that banks generally and their customers normally intend the local
261
law to apply."For American banks, the English territorial bias on what constitutes the proper
law is an important element in the attractiveness of London as a center for Eurodollar
accounts. The English courts' refusal to give extraterritorial effect to American laws
has the prophylactic effect of protecting foreign depositors to some extent from
application of American economic regulations.
254. Id. at 335, 345-46.
255. Id. at 322.
256. Id. at 328.
257. The law that the parties intend to govern the contract or the law of the place to which the contract is most closely
connected. See A. DIctrY & J. Motmus, supra note 109, at 1161.
258. Bankers Trust, [1989] 3 W.L.R. at 330.
259. Id. at 330-32.
260. Id. at 331.
261. Id.
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The policy conflict is stark. On the one hand, American banks are interested in
taking deposits abroad. 262 The more money taken in, the more money can be lent out
with the appropriate "spread" between the interest rate paid on deposits and the rate
charged on loans. More deposits generally mean more loans and thus more profits.
Yet many prospective customers attracted to the financial stability of American
institutions are wary of subjecting their money to the jurisdiction of the American
government and its potential asset freezes.
In determining whether paying the Libyans in London necessarily involved the
commission of an illegal act in the United States, the court distinguished between the
performance itself and the preparation for performance. The court viewed the transfer
of funds in New York through the CHIPS system as merely preparatory to the
payment of the deposit in London.2 63 What is more, the court found that the Libyans
had no intention or interest in having Bankers Trust commit an illegal act in New
York, 264 and were prepared to accept payment by any commercially recognized
means that bypassed New York. Staughton found that no implied term existed that
payment be made through CHIPS 265 and concluded that the Libyans were entitled to
demand payment in cash in London (either in dollars or the sterling equivalent) and
that such payment, while cumbersome, did not involve any illegal activity in New
York.266

The Bankers Trust litigation raised liability-side policy conflicts at several different levels. The American attempt to apply its economic regulation to foreign
branches of its financial institutions ran into the English insistence on the sovereignty
of its local law over local operations of local branches. Both banker and depositor
were caught in the middle. The American bank itself was in a deeply ambivalent
posture. On the one hand, the bank's duty as an American institution was to respect
American law. On the other hand, the bank could not help recognizing the loss of
confidence among foreign depositors that would result if Eurocurrency accounts were
subject to American asset freezes. A victory by Bankers Trust would have been
Pyrrhic if it had led to a diminution of its share of Eurodollar deposits.
The Libyans' action for payment on their deposits parallels the actions by
American banks for payment on foreign debt subject to exchange controls. In both
cases the sanctity of contract-honoring one's word and meeting shared expectations-ran headlong into measures intended to safeguard vital national interests.
Hostages and freeze orders, like debt crisis and exchange controls, claimed a problematic priority over normal rules about promises.

262. See Rutzke, supra note 233, at 252-54 (discussing the reasons behind the creation of Eurodollar accounts).
263. Bankers Trust, [1988] 3 W.L.R. at 329.
264. Id. at 330.
265. Id. at 341-43,344. Staughton, J., also rejected the position espoused by Dr. Mann that the "Eurodollar market
is a mere account market rather than a money market" and that therefore the only form of payment that the Libyans could
demand was a credit effectuated through CHIPS to their account at a nominated beneficiary bank.
266. Id. at 341-43, 349-50. Although it is unclear whether Bankers Trust had reached a decision on whether to
appeal, the decision was taken out of their hands when the United States Treasury Department without comment issued
a license under the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 550.209 (1987), allowing the bank to pay the judgment
with interest. Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
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One commentator 267 has suggested that the court in the Bankers Trust case
should have followed a "balancing of the interests approach," rather than a "cashbased" legal reasoning approach. By applying the principles of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States,268 she suggests, a British court might
conclude that the United States had an interest in blocking Libyan assets sufficiently
strong to make it unreasonable for Britain to prescribe a conflicting rule. 269 Personally I remain skeptical, however, that a British court could bring itself to subordinate
its interests to those of American policies when courts of the United States have
exhibited an unwillingness to defer to foreign interests in similar cases. 270
The Bankers Trust case held that the Libyans could unilaterally modify the
bifurcated nature of the managed account arrangement linking London and New York
funds. The court concluded that LAFB had properly terminated the account by telex
in either April or July of 1986, leaving the London account separate from the New
York account. 27' The court did not consider whether the right to modify the arrangement unilaterally was an interest in property that was frozen under the January 8th
order. However, this issue was dealt with in a later case involving similar facts.
This time, the case was brought against Manufacturers Hanover Trust (MHT).272
The court dealt with the alleged illegality, under the American freeze order, of
unilateral Libyan termination of the managed account arrangement. Concluding that
the account transfer arrangement did not have any economic value, the court found
that the bifurcated arrangement was not an interest in property that could be frozen
by Presidential order.
In an article examining asset control regulations and discussing the LAFB cases,
one scholar has argued that United States Government sanctions with extraterritorial
effect will always be subject to attack in the relevant foreign forum. 273 He goes on to
state that although this potential problem might be met by skillful drafting in the
deposit contract, a bank might fail to anticipate the need for such a clause or it might
feel uncomfortable about negotiating such a clause with a foreign client. 274 Thus, he
concludes that banks involved in international activities are in effect left to absorb the
275
risk of future sanctions as best they can.
The LAFB cases illustrate the need for coordinated banking supervision at the
international level. Currently, one means of such supervision is being accomplished
267. Joyce, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust: Common Law Meets ItsLimits?, 29 HARV. INr'L L.J. 451
(1988).
268. At the time the Comment was written, the Restatement (Third) was still in draft form. Thus, th6 author made
reference to RErTATmENT (RavisEo) oF FOREIGN RELATION S LAW OF THEUNrrED STATES
§ 403 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
Section 403 is discussed supra at footnote 218.
269. Joyce, supra note 267, at 472.
270. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text for discussion of In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation.
271. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 314, 327-28 (Q.B. 1987).
272. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 494, [19891 1 Lloyd's Rep.
608 (Q.B. 1989). MHT (unlike Bankers Trust) had stamped its account documents as follows: "This deposit or placement
is payable at Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, London and shall be governed by the laws of England."
273. Malloy, U.S. InternationalBanking and Treasury'sForeignAssets Controls: SpringingTrapsfor the Unwary,
8 ANN. REv. BANero L. 181, 266-67 (1989).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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through the Basle Supervisors' Committee. Comprised of representatives of the central banks and bank supervisory authorities from eleven leading industrialized countries and Luxembourg, the Committee's goals include a convergence of bank supervisory practices. 276 The Committee's most recent and most significant efforts have
been in the capital adequacy area. In July 1988, the Committee issued a final proposal
setting forth a suggested framework for measuring the adequacy of capital retained by
banks and suggesting a minimum capital amount that all banks operating internationally should seek to maintain. Such a framework is important to prevent what the
Committee perceives to be an undesirable further erosion of bank capital and to
provide a better means of determining the levels of capital employed or maintained
by major international banks. Although the Basel proposal has no binding effect, the
governments represented on the Committee have agreed to follow the principles of
277
the report.
IV. CONCLUSION

The world debt crisis highlights several themes that operate as a refrain on both
the asset and the liability sides of the bank balance sheet. Foremost among these is
that agreements-whether loans or deposits-are meant to be enforced. Without
confidence that obligations will be honored, financial intermediaries will be unable to
fulfill their function of channeling savings to enterprises and to individuals in need of
capital.
Yet vital national interests inevitably present excuses for government actions
that reduce contract enforceability. Exchange controls are among the ways that both
lending and borrowing nations indulge the temptation to interfere with the bankercustomer relationship when parochial national goals are at stake. The legitimate
interest of debtor countries in protecting currency reserves competes with the interest
of the lender's jurisdiction in enforcing freely accepted loans.
Policy conflicts within nations also cast themselves as issues that work their way
into the lawyer's domain. On the asset side of the bank's balance sheet, intricacies of
the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity implicate two not entirely consistent
objectives: the need for confidence in the enforceability of international loan agreements, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the desire to reduce the risk that
judicial decisions will hinder sensitive government-to-government negotiations.
Finally, the community of nations as an aggregate knows a common interest in
monetary cooperation and free payment on current transactions that does not always
marry well with the respect that members of the global community expect each other
to show toward their exchange control regulations.
On the liability side of the balance sheet, unfortunate conflicts have arisen
between the United States and some of its important allies and trading partners,
notably Switzerland and Great Britain. To enforce American tax and securities reg276. Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors' Committee, 23 INT'L LAw. 245, 248-49 (1989). See generally, R.
DALE, THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1984).

277. Norton, supra note 276, at 259-62.
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ulations, American courts have sought disclosure of bank records despite secrecy
laws intended to preserve the integrity of private banking. American reactions to
events in Iran and Libya led to freezing of Eurodollar deposits within British territory,
and the consequential conflict with British assertion of sovereignty over accounts at
bank branches within its territory.
Within the United States, the foreign investor's desire for anonymity and freedom from tax has played itself out in a tension between measures to attract foreign
capital, and the need for information to enforce its economic regulations. And the
interest of American banks in attracting deposits has run afoul of the government's
use of economic regulations as an instrument of foreign policy.
Bank secrecy plays a part in the debt crisis because it facilitates capital flight
from debtor countries. Depositors eager for financial anonymity include residents of
politically unstable lands seeking to avoid discriminatory confiscation and tax evaders
seeking a kinder fiscal environment. In addition, drug runners and fraudsters seek to
hide the fruit of their criminal activity. Whether the world would be a better place
without bank secrecy depends on whether one takes the perspective of the victim of
Nazi persecution who was helped to safety by a Zurich bank account, or the outlook
of law enforcement officials trying to catch a cocaine dealer. Treaties that lift bank
secrecy must distinguish between such dramatically different uses of financial confidentiality.
These competing policies result in a tapestry of legal rules woven by the interplay of rival objectives. One should not be surprised that the colors of this tapestry
do not always harmonize. As Emerson reminded us, a foolish consistency is the
hobgoblin of little minds. However, insofar as clashing rules make it more difficult
for trans-border banking to play a constructive role in the global wealth creation
process, lawyers in international finance have a duty to face squarely and openly the
connections between conflicts engendered on both sides of the balance sheet so as to
elaborate an explicit principled priority among the competing goals and rules.

